

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CHRISTIANITY AND WORLD-PROBLEMS

BY THE REV.
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Introduction

THE modern mind often seems little more than a mass of problems, and modern religion, instead of bringing a solution to these problems, seems only to add to them. An apology is indeed needed for inflicting any further reference to such an overworked word as problem : we all are tired of hearing it. But so long as the modern mind is conscious of problems, we must consider them, and we are endeavouring in the following pages to show that Christianity is able to meet, embrace, and solve the problems which for our generation have expanded to the size and burden of world-problems, and are specially so designated because they are concerned with matters of scientific observation and human need which press upon us all. At the same time, it must be pointed out that half the bewilderment with which so many thoughtful people look out upon the world and its ways is due to the lack of really fundamental thinking and a firmly based faith. Our generation has a strange unwillingness to inquire into the validity of human thought, or it might discover that faith is implicit in the very act of

thought; and it seems incapable of recognising that there underlies our very consciousness of a problem some assurance that truth is operative upon our minds.

It is almost impossible, however, to expect anything more than a crop of problems when we are so averse from anything involving philosophical inquiry or necessitating a metaphysical decision; and since Christianity, as a deep-delving religion, involves ultimate questions and is itself a metaphysic, its sanctions and solutions cannot be fully grasped while such questions are shirked; yet it seems possible to use the pressure of the empirical and practical problems of our age to compel some consideration of more fundamental questions and so to open the way for a return to faith; and this line of approach is the only one that many may be able to take.

So far as one mind can enter into the difficulties of another, an endeavour will be made to face any world-problem which weighs upon the modern mind, and if it can hardly be hoped that the consideration of these problems will itself lead to the conviction that Christianity can solve them, and is therefore bound to be true, it may at least be hoped that it can be shown that no other solution is possible, and therefore that the positive establishment of the truth of Christianity is the greatest

need of our age, as well for the salvation of the world as for the satisfaction of the individual soul. Such proof of the truth of Christianity must be sought elsewhere; here it is only attempted to show to practical-minded persons, who so often shirk and contemn theoretical inquiry, that our problems arise from the undermining or collapse of faith, and await for their solution a world-wide acceptance and thoroughgoing application of the Christian religion. But, in addition, the faith of some who are perplexed and distressed by the questionings of the modern mind may be established and reinforced if it can be shown that Christianity can meet the problems of this generation, and that its greatness and power are only the further disclosed as it is confronted by facts and the practical questions to which they give rise. Christianity rests ultimately upon the invisible; it appeals to spiritual vision for its only convincing evidence; but it can be shown to be equally at home in this world of time and sense, and is practically demonstrated as the only explanation of existence and the one worthy purpose of human life. It is only because the things of the senses are allowed to blot out the necessity for deep thought and fundamental faith that they give rise not only to perplexities, but to problems which are thus rendered insoluble.

Among the many difficulties that are felt about Christianity by the modern mind, one of the most constantly met with is that it is not adequate to the universe as it is revealed by science, or to human need as that grows and is progressively felt by thoughtful people. Such difficulties often lie deeper and present more resistance to solution than the difficulties usually voiced about details in the Christian faith ; and many of the discussions concerning the intellectual basis of Christianity are dictated by the insurgent feeling we have when we look out upon the vastness of the world, the extent of history, and the greatness of human need, that Christianity cannot compass such immensities. This obstinate suspicion remains to colour our outlook and influence our thought, and tends to recur with fresh and sometimes disturbing insistency, despite all proffered arguments and settled convictions. Behind all difficulties, however, there must lie a further revelation if we will but seek it; behind all facts there is God's truth, to which our minds must submit, through whatever channels that truth may come : therefore we are going to try to face these difficulties and work slowly through the problems presented by the modern world-outlook, shirking no difficulty that has made any impression on the human mind.

We begin our study of world-problems and the difficulties they create for faith, by considering the vastness of the universe as it is disclosed by scientific observation, and whether the Person of Christ can still be regarded as an adequate origin and consummation of such a mighty machine.

The contemplation of the starry heavens has nearly always awakened in man profound and serious thoughts. It led the writers of the Scriptures to the thought of God's glory: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork." It has prompted their comparison with the insignificance of man: "When I consider Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars which Thou hast ordained; what is man, that Thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that Thou visitest him?" The Psalmist was unconscious of any feeling of despair, or depression, as he looked up to the nightly skies, but on the contrary was moved with gratitude that God should have counted man more worthy and precious than all the

starry worlds the heavens displayed. The glory and the vastness of the universe was a basis for religious reverence and for gratitude, and this is the impression they have made upon the majority of mankind. Why should this have been altered or destroyed by the further revelation of the immensely greater vastness and order of the universe which has come to our generation through modern astronomy? Laplace, the great astronomer who formulated the nebular hypothesis, certainly thought that this made God unnecessary, but as a general rule astronomers have not been atheistically inclined; the majestic vision of the heavens unfolded by the telescope, and constantly studied, has produced an impression on their minds at least of reverence for the mighty power which must lie behind this stupendous display. Others, however, have felt that the consideration of the heavens makes God so inconceivable in His greatness, and so remote from human affairs, as to make it quite impossible to conceive of Him as caring for our tiny earth or for the single souls that swarm upon it. I have known a young person's faith considerably shaken by the presentation of a few astronomical facts. But even Pascal, who through his mathematical knowledge knew something of the immensities involved in the astronomy of his day, and whose faith sus-

tained itself against the appearances of things by those reasons of the heart which, as he said, reason does not know, could only exclaim as he looked up into the sky: "The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me." To regard this world, in addition, as a theatre of divine redemption has always been a daring conception, and at present is a tremendous challenge both to reason and faith, while to claim, as the New Testament claims, that a person who has walked our planet was not only the author of our redemption, but was the agent of creation, brings to an acute issue the impressions of empirical observation and the declarations of religious faith. If we put it in this way, that this mighty universe is supposed to have been made by one who lived on this tiny earth for thirty-three years as a man, and died rejected and powerless at the hands of his enemies, it makes an exhausting demand upon our faith. Can such a belief be any longer held by thoughtful people who know something of the measure of this mighty universe?

Let us first recall what modern astronomy reveals. The reminder of a few facts and figures which are now commonplace knowledge will suffice to indicate the almost incalculable number of the worlds and the unimaginable size of the universe. It is esti-

mated that there are 7000 stars visible to the naked eye, but the strongest telescope, aided by the photographic plate, increases this figure to the estimated number of 120 millions. It must be remembered that these stars are really suns, like our own sun, but immensely farther away, and many of them enormously greater. Let us represent the situation by a series of comparisons: while our familiar moon is only 238,000 miles away—that is, roughly, ten times the circumference of the earth—the sun is 93,000,000 miles off, or nearly 400 times farther off than the moon. Of the fixed planets, we have been able to discover that Neptune is 2,771,400,000 miles away from the sun, or nearly 30 times farther off than we are. This gives us the extent of what we call the solar system; but the solar system is only one item in the sidereal system. So we must extend our comparison further: the nearest star is 25½ billion miles away (a billion equals a million millions)—that is, 271,400 times farther than the sun. But we are now completely lost; imagination breaks down; such figures have no meaning to our minds; and when we come to estimate our distance from the farthest star we have to drop our units altogether and adopt the unit of "light years," and then it is said that the farthest star visible is 200,000 light years away. If we

want to know how many miles that is, we must take the rate at which light travels—that is, 186,000 miles a second—multiply that by the number of seconds in a year, and then by 200,000. But the "light years" unit does express this distance in a way that is more imaginable, for it means that the light from the farthest star has taken 200,000 years to reach this earth, travelling at the rate of 186,000 miles a second. There are times when one is tempted to get somewhat agnostic about these figures, but it is impossible to question the conclusion that although these figures may be only rough, they are in the main true.

Let us now consider the size of things. The size of the sun may be represented by the fact that it is 108 times the diameter of the earth; but when we see the star Betelgeuse glittering on the shoulder of Orion, we get some idea of its size when it is stated that not only could the sun, but the earth's orbit round the sun, be traced on its diameter and there still be room to spare.

Let us now turn away from these burdensome figures and consider some of the speculations that have been built upon them. It is conceivable that all these stars, like our own sun, may have planets, and that these planets may be inhabited like our own; and some astronomical observers believe that Mars, one

of the planets of our system, shows signs of being inhabited. The relation of our planet to this mighty scheme of worlds seems to make it insignificant and unimportant. To its smallness, for it is one of the smallest of the sun's planets, must be added its subsidiary position. The geocentric astronomy which made our earth the centre of the universe was revolutionised by the discovery of Copernicus that the sun is the centre of our system ; and modern astronomy has made us aware that our sun is only a star and a but inconsiderable member of the sidereal system. It is possible that the stars visible to us may form only one among other sidereal systems, and that there are others separated from our vision by oceans of darkness. It was thought at one time that the nebulæ, which occur in some of the constellations, were in reality other universes, showing only as a faint mist in our sky, because of their enormous distance ; and there seems no reason why there should not be an endless series of such universes, although beyond our discovery. The idea that the universe is actually infinite is not put forward by thoughtful astronomers to-day, but it is possible that there are other systems beside the one we inhabit, and anyhow the number of the worlds this may hold is beyond calculation.

It is now generally believed that the sidereal system came to its present condition through a process of evolution; that just as there has been evolution of life in this planet, so there has been evolution in the heavens above; and that the universe as we see it to-day is either a condensation of the nebular substance which once scattered throughout the spaces now occupied by the stars, or an aggregation of the atomic dust which we know to be floating about in interstellar space. Moreover, it is believed that the telescope can actually detect worlds which are in course both of development and decay, and it is now thought that the nebulæ are in process of becoming systems like our own.

It must be pointed out at the outset that these facts are really irrelevant to any claims religion may put forward, while the speculations built on them are nothing more than speculations and sometimes very unlikely to be true. The size of the universe, for instance, is certainly no disproof of God's power, and therefore need be no disproof of His care. Indeed, its greatness provides some measure of His majesty and His mind. If this universe was created by Personal Mind, then that Mind is at least capable of this universe. The contemplation and study of the greatness of nature and the might of the universe is indeed

a necessary corrective to some types of piety. The intimate familiarity with God to which religion invites us should never diminish reverence for His glory and awe at His greatness: and of this the scientific observation of nature, and especially of the heavens, suffices to remind us. But this vastness need not involve any diminution of God's care for its minutest part, and therefore for our tiny planet; for there is not only vastness visible in our universe, there is order, there is stability, there is provision. There meet together in this planet of ours a number of varying conditions without which life, as we know it, could not possibly exist: such conditions as atmosphere, distance from the sun, length of day and night, relative proportion of land and water, and many others. It is by the exact proportion and concatenation of these varied conditions that terrestrial life is made possible, and if one of these conditions was missing or was in a different proportion, life could not continue. The apparent disorder of the sky, as if the stars had been scattered from a careless hand, may be only apparent. For a long time it was thought the planets pursued a wandering motion of their own, and were therefore so named, but under the Copernican astronomy the motion of the planets has been mathematically resolved, so that we know they

each describe a regular orbit round the sun. Not only so, but the orbits of the planets reveal a mathematical proportion in their respective distances from the sun.

Again, although it has now been discovered that our own sun and the stars are in motion, at the rate of anything from a mile to a hundred miles per second, yet they seem to keep their relative positions ; and it has therefore been speculated that just as our sun is the centre of its system, the sidereal system has its centre too, and everything is revolving round it ; and if the whole universe is itself in motion, then it again is only in motion round some, for us, undiscoverable and invisible centre. Therefore, arguing from what we actually know, it seems safe to assume that the stellar universe, which looks to us so capricious and disorderly, may in reality be a most accurately balanced system, in which every point of force and motion is necessary to the stability of the whole ; so that if a star could fall (for what we call shooting stars are, of course, not stars at all) the whole thing would crash and dissolve in dust.

All arguments which have tried to dispense with God as the Author and Maintainer of the universe can be shown to be invalid. Though there seems to be evidence that the universe is finite, even if it could be proved that it was

infinite, that would not disprove the infinity of God. The infinity of God and the infinity of the universe are two different kinds of infinity, and the infinity of matter would have no meaning save to an infinite mind. Or if this universe has evolved from some simpler state and had its origin in latent energy, that does not dispense with the necessity for a non-material origin or dispense with the Mind that originated energy and planned this process; for motion could not be self-originated, and energy is not a form of existence which sufficiently accounts for itself. Although there is probably evidence that the motion of the universe has developed and accelerated, it could not have started from nothing. It seems difficult to shake the popular prejudice, for it cannot be called a serious thought, that to know how a thing is done proves that God did not do it. Surely if it can be explained how a thing is done, that is a sort of proof that it was mind that did it. The process by which the universe has come to be may be the one that best suits God's eternal purpose. If the universe be designated a machine, that demands a mind for its manufacturer, and the highest product of the machine, which is mind, merely reveals that mind was its purpose as well as its author.

The question whether other worlds are

populated does not affect the argument one way or another. The conditions necessary to life are multifarious, and sound thinkers have believed it is neither likely to occur by accident nor to recur anywhere else. On this basis Alfred Russel Wallace came to the conclusion that this earth was alone peopled, but his arguments do not preclude the idea that entirely different beings with a different basis for life might exist in other worlds. Only planets, of course, could sustain life; the stars are blazing furnaces of light; but even they might be the abode of spiritual beings. Unless we concede the possibility of habitation to other systems it is difficult to see what purpose there is in the prodigality of the heavenly bodies; unless we might speculate that the stars played a part in the evolution of the earth similar to that of the animal species in the evolution of the human body; or is it stretching our tenuous faith too far to accept the Biblical explanation that the heavens were created to declare the glory of God to the mind of man?

It is the doctrine of relativity which builds a bridge from these speculations towards a more positive reconstruction. The word and even the idea of relativity is old, but the modern meaning of the word, especially as applied to motion, even disposes of the controversy

whether the earth goes round the sun or the sun goes round the earth, in which controversy ecclesiastical authority is generally supposed to have made itself ridiculous; for it all depends upon where you take your stand. If everything is moving, you must take your stand outside the things that move, if you are going to determine its motion, and eventually you have to take your stand upon an abstract and invisible idea, namely, on that of Absolute Mind. It is often forgotten that all this measurement of mass and motion which seems to diminish the significance of the human mind is, after all, a mental conception. The universe is only measurable by mind; its might and vastness are entirely relative to the human mind, for it is the human mind that discovered how to measure and interpret the motion of the stars; the vastness thus revealed is mirrored in the mind of man; it is man's mind that alone can feel its immensity, and man's mind is not really exhausted by it. Though imagination may fail, the intellect does not, and if we could draw a confine to the universe, the soaring intellect will ask why it should not continue farther. If we are told that light is the swiftest form of motion, we know that thought is infinitely swifter; for it is thought that measures light, flies beyond the farthest space, and asks

the question, What lies beyond? It is the virtual infinity of the mind that is able to declare the universe to be finite, and is therefore greater than the universe. And influences other than the purely intellectual, and other influences than purely scientific facts, should be taken into account. The glory, the beauty, the peace which men have felt as they have gazed upon the heavenly bodies, are as relevant as material facts and measurements to the interpretation of the universe. If this be questioned, we must be reminded that the discernment of motion and the sense of might is as much a mental fact as the sense of peace or the feeling of beauty. It will therefore generally be found that it is not those who have studied astronomy through the eyepiece of some great telescope, nor the people who dwell under the clear, open skies of the desert, but the folk who never look at the stars at all, and who know them only through books crowded with overwhelming figures, who feel that to consider the heavens is a hindrance to faith. As a matter of fact, the great religions were all born under the naked light of the stars when there were neither houses nor smoke to hide or obscure them.

It may be, therefore, that the sense of glory and beauty and peace which the human mind feels as it observes the stars was at least one

of the purposes for which they shine. When we have recovered from being frightened at mere size and overwhelmed by mere numbers, and have considered the matter deeply, we may come back to the simple belief that the universe is of the size and grandeur it is in order to convey to man adequate conceptions of the Creator. This must not be dismissed as impossible, for it would be difficult to discern a worthier purpose than for God to awaken man to the knowledge of Himself. That would be only to make sufficient provision for man's supreme need. What is the good of providing man with air, and sea, and sky, if these do not tell us something about the mind and heart of God? It is the conviction of Catholic theology that man gets his first thoughts of God by looking at the world around him and asking how that world comes to be; and it must need a world of such vastness to make those thoughts worthy of the Being of God. It must be remembered also, when we are considering these matters, that the creation of man is a greater work than the creation of the world; for without man the world would have had no meaning; and the redemption of the human race is more wonderful than either. This was recognised by one of the early Church Fathers, in whose writings we find the following passage:

" It is not the vastness of the heavens and the bright shining of its constellations, the order of the universe and the unbroken administration over all existence, that so manifestly displays the transcendent power of the Deity, as this condescension to the weakness of our nature, the way in which sublimity is actually seen in lowliness, and yet the loftiness descends not " (Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. Cat. Mag.* xxiv.).

It ought not to be impossible, therefore, in the light of modern knowledge, still to regard Christ as the clue to the cause and purpose of the universe ; for even if Christ is only regarded as the supreme production of the human race, as such He must be some index to the Mind which created the world, and His personality some indication of the purpose of creation. But the New Testament claims something for Christ more directly concerned with creation. Can we still assent to this ? Let us recall what the New Testament writers actually say on this matter. First, there is St. Paul, who writes : " To us there is one God the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him : and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him." And again : " For in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth ; . . . all things have been created

through Him, and unto Him; and He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together." The writer to the Hebrews, speaking of the Son, says: "Whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom also He made the worlds; who . . . upholding all things by the word of His power." And in the prologue to the Fourth Gospel we read concerning the Word: "All things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made that hath been made." Now this testimony, which, according to criticism, comes from three different writers, ascribes creation to Jesus Christ. It has been supposed by radical critics that this teaching represents the consummation of a movement by which Christ was gradually deified and at last identified with the Creator, and that the impulse toward this was derived partly from the personification of Wisdom in the Old Testament and partly from the idea of the Logos developed by Greek philosophy. It must be pointed out, however, that the doctrine seems to have roots also in the teaching of Jesus, who said, "All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father," and "All power is given unto Me in heaven and earth."

Now it is, from the nature of the case, impossible to demonstrate that this doctrine is scientifically true, or to prove it by reason.

It is a doctrine due to what religion ascribes to revelation; but we can show that it is not unreasonable, and that there is nothing in scientific principles which makes it inconceivable. But first the doctrine must be delivered from crude interpretations. For instance, the New Testament does not simply declare that Jesus created the world. Its various declarations on the point agree in setting forth that the creation was wrought *through* the Eternal Word, who became incarnate in Jesus — that is to say, the Son exercised a mediatorial, not an originating, function; and this conception is completed by the idea that the creation moves together towards Christ, and so, through Him, is brought back to God; so that Christ plays not only a mediatorial but a teleological part in the creation. This doctrine only states in personal and very vivid form what can be expressed in more abstract and philosophical terms, namely, that at the beginning there was Mind, and that its purpose in the creation is the perfection of man. And surely science leaves room for, and actually assumes, a similar conclusion. The only difference in the Christian revelation is that it points to an individual man in human history, whom it singles out as the norm and goal of humanity, and supports this by declaring that He is more than a

human individual: He is the personal incarnation of the divine Logos, Mind, or Reason. Further exposition of this conception would involve exploring the fully developed doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which cannot be undertaken here. We are only attempting to secure ground for a meeting-point between scientific and philosophical principles and the Christian religion, and to prevent that revelation being discounted without further examination by urging the consideration that since science and philosophy assume that man's mind can mirror and understand the material universe, there must be some harmony between mind and matter, which needs some accounting for, which the doctrine of the Incarnation actually and alone provides.

The most accepted theology of the Church holds that the Incarnation would not have taken place if man had not fallen and lost his way, and so blurred his reason and weakened his moral powers; and the Incarnation is therefore only a republication and remedial disclosure of the intention and purpose of God. Probably if man had perfectly co-operated with the purpose of the universe, then in every man that purpose would have been as clear as scientific fact. Every man would have known the purpose of creation from his own mind, and

in his self-determined nature would have mirrored the glory of God and would have been seen to be the crown of creation. Science does more than hint that this is the truth : it actually assumes it. What the Incarnation has done is to confirm the underlying assumptions of science and reveal to the mind of man the original purpose of creation ; it discloses the meaning of existence, it corresponds to the highest human aspirations, it republishes the message which is written in the heavens, and it repairs man's nature so that he can once again by the help of divine grace make God's purposes his own.

Therefore if we only consider deeply enough we shall not only be profoundly moved by the discovery that the measure and majesty of the heavens are after all reflected in our own minds, and recognise with Kant the significance of the fact that there are two things that fill us with awe—the starry heavens without and the moral law within ; but we shall feel we are able both to think astronomically and to worship Christ devotionally, and find that the two functions fertilise one another. Even if we were to argue quite naturalistically, and make Christ merely the highest product of this mighty machine, then He would still be its explanation, and there would be ground for perfect trust. But theologically we can rise

to the idea, which is so full of noble inspiration and capable of such endless application, that Christ stands for the whole movement of creation, from the divine Reason that conceived it to the recapitulation of all things in Him. And mystically we can worship Him, with the aid of astronomic symbolism, as the Bright and Morning Star, the Glory and Sun of the spiritual universe, who gathers about Him as centre a universe of souls that shall shine as the stars for ever, and become, through the assumption of our humanity by Christ, and the sanctification of our souls by the Spirit, the glorious, glittering garment of God.

Chapter II *Christ and the Ages*

In our last chapter we were considering the immense size of the universe, and when we recovered from the first feeling of overwhelming vastness, we bethought ourselves that, after all, the immensity of the universe created no difficulty to a true conception of God, but even served as a symbol and reminder of His spiritual immensity. We also came to the conclusion that the enormous size of the universe is no disproof that God cares for this earth, for, whether ours be the only inhabited planet or not, there meet in it a series of conditions which alone make life upon it possible, and which cannot be referred to chance.

Moreover, if man needs revelation and redemption as well as physical life and material provision, we can expect that the magnanimity of God who made the worlds is capable of answering to the desires of man's heart, and if His power can hold the worlds together, it is also in His power to comfort the lonely people on this earth. It will be remembered how the Psalmist deliberately

groups together the might and mercy of God : " He gathereth together the outcasts . . . He healeth the broken in heart, and bindeth up their wounds. He telleth the number of the stars ; He giveth them all their names " (Ps. cxlvii. 2–4). We also feel persuaded that, since it is man's mind that mirrors and measures the universe, it is not inconceivable that the divine Wisdom should be able to incarnate Itself in a human mind, in order to reassure us of His care and restore faith to our souls. Although at first faith may be staggered by the immensity of the universe, it is finally strengthened by perceiving that the moral immensity of the Incarnation is a worthy crown to the material immensity of the creation.

But behind this solution there lurks a further difficulty, which to many minds seems even more burdensome to faith, namely, the enormous period of time since our universe came into existence, the ages it has taken to prepare our earth for the habitation of man, and the ever-lengthening vistas of human history. The figures for the magnitude of the universe are enormous, but they are equalled and exceeded by those demanded for the beginning of the universe, the age of our earth, and the antiquity of man : for these figures have been only multiplied by

every advance in physical and anthropological research.

The old calculations of Biblical chronology placed the creation at 4000 years before Christ. This date can be pushed further back by a recalculation based upon the Septuagint version of the Scriptures to over 5000 years before Christ ; and this in turn can be interpreted as the date for the creation of man, rather than for the creation of the world. For the six days ascribed to the creation of the world in Genesis can be taken as only symbolical units of vast times, and many expositors, both among the Early Fathers and in modern times, have believed this to be a legitimate interpretation. But even if we take advantage of these adjustments in order to make room for the time now demanded by geologists and astronomers, no extension of Biblical chronology can be made which will satisfy the demands of anthropologists for the antiquity of man. Anthropologists want at the lowest estimate 5000 years before Christ for the relics of civilisation which have survived ; and when it is remembered how frail the monuments of a more primitive civilisation must have been, it is no wonder that the beginnings of civilisation are put by many at a much earlier age. On the theory that even this civilisation must be the product of long evolu-

tion, the origin of the human species is placed millenniums earlier; and this seems to be confirmed by the remains of prehistoric and uncivilised man which are now continually being brought to light. What are believed to be human remains have been found buried at a depth which it is calculated indicates that they belonged to men who lived 500,000 years ago. From recent research it is assumed that the modern type of man is much older than the type represented by these remains; for it is believed that they belong to another branch of the human stem which came to an end: our branch does not derive from them, but from a lower position, as it were, down the trunk of life. They are not the direct ancestors of modern man, but a collateral branch. It is therefore calculated, for instance by an authority like Sir Arthur Keith, that the distinctively human type separated from the general anthropoid stem two million years ago; and if it is to be decided that in order to be endowed with specifically human attributes the brain must have reached a capacity of 1000 cubic centimetres, then what deserves to be classified as the human species is at least one million years old.

The accuracy of such figures might be questioned and the validity of the data on which they are based disputed, but it is not

our intention to do that, for it would be useless for the lightening of our problem, since we have to face enormous figures elsewhere ; and it is the vast extent of time, and not mere details, which constitute what seems to be a burden to religious faith.

It will be remembered from figures previously quoted that the farthest star which we can see must be at least 200,000 years old ; because its light has taken that time to reach our earth. But we have to push much further beyond such figures to find the age even of this earth. It is now believed that the age of the earth can be calculated from various factors, some of which we must content ourselves merely by enumerating without further exposition. They are : the eccentricity of the planet Mercury ; the degeneration of uranium into lead, ordinarily called radio-activity ; the amount of salt which the rivers have poured into the ocean ; the energy radiated by the sun ; the time required for the cooling and distribution of the earth's present temperature ; and the effect of tidal friction on the time of the earth's rotation. By the application of higher mathematics to these different factors it is believed that results can be found which are not only accurate in themselves but actually confirm one another ; using these factors as the basis, by the methods of higher mathematics, you can prove that

your calculations are correct, because they all work out roughly to the same result. Perhaps it ought to be pointed out that in earlier calculations similarly converging results were obtained, but with much smaller figures. Nevertheless, there can be no question that we have to consider enormous figures; and, for our purpose, we shall be wise to deal with the most recent figures, on the assumption that they are correct, or only likely to be increased. According to the most recent calculations, the date when this earth was formed, probably by being thrown off from the sun, is given as somewhere between 13,000 million and 80,000 million years ago, which are the lower and upper limits. This, then, is the age of the earth. After the earth was formed, other things happened in a comparatively short time. For instance, the moon was torn from the earth only 10,000 years after the earth was torn from the sun. The earth ceased to be a mere gaseous mass, and became solid as soon as 18,000 years after its birth. It is believed also that we can date the ocean as 1340 million years old; and life, therefore, appeared on this planet somewhere between that date, as the most remote, and 500 million years ago, as the nearest possible date to us.

Beyond these calculations of the age of the earth there is the question of the age of the

universe as it is revealed to us in the sidereal system. That must be immensely older if the theory, either of nebular condensation or of molecular aggregation, be true ; and it is so far beyond all calculation that no one has even attempted it.

These enormous periods seem to impart an intolerable extension to the simple outlook of faith. They lend some room to the speculation that the earth as it is to-day may have come into existence as the outcome of an infinite series developing the infinite possibilities of its combinations by an infinite number of trials spread over infinite time, of which the present order is but one ; for on that basis anything could be accounted for. Most philosophers believe, however, that the infinite is absolutely excluded from any calculations concerned with material existence. But if your mind inclines to the belief that you can have an infinite series, then, granted an infinite material with infinite possibilities and infinite combinations, if you had infinite time to try them, you could at last get this world. An illustration of what is meant can be given on a much smaller scale. Suppose the type which constitutes the Bible could all be broken up and thrown into a heap, and then by a series of chance throws it was once again spread out in a line ; if you went on doing that long enough there is a possibility

that the Bible would in one of the throws emerge in its present order. But just suppose that this is conceivable, and it is perhaps just barely conceivable: if it happened we should be bound to admit that this was a most astonishing result; but we should also immediately conclude that there must have been the exact amount of type required to set up the Bible, without a single letter missing or over; we should be compelled to infer that there had been an intelligent arrangement preceding the chance throws; indeed, we should suspect that the type had been set up and afterwards distributed. And yet beside the inconceivable chance of such a thing, the idea that the universe has come into existence by a similar process, without a like prearranged possibility, is infinitely more speculative and, if one may say so, infinitely more impossible.

Now, the point where the pressure upon our faith is felt probably does not consist merely in the immense age of the universe. The age of the universe only enables us to comprehend something of what is meant by eternity: if this is the length of time it is still nothing compared to the eternity of God. For although eternity is not the multiplication of time to whatever extent that could be carried, nevertheless, just as we found the immensity of the universe to be a symbol of the immensity

of the mind of God, so the age of the universe may be used as a symbol of the immensity of eternity. The Scholastic theology did not deny the *a priori* possibility that the creation might be as eternal as God. It was only on the basis of revelation that it believed that the creation had a beginning ; but it is interesting to notice that with this fact of revelation, which some would be unwilling to accept on that basis only, science agrees. For while philosophy can contemplate the possibility of an eternal universe, science says this universe actually had a beginning. It is to be suspected that the difficulty felt is that God should have taken such an enormous time to bring the universe to realise His purpose, so far as that has even yet been reached. Perhaps the old picture in *Paradise Lost* of the sudden creation of the various species might seem to some of us more Godlike ; though surely few have been able to read it without feeling slightly amused. Perhaps it would be a more philosophically satisfactory picture of creation to conceive that the whole world came into existence in one moment complete : not only " He spake the word and it was done," but " He thought and it was." But if we feel our faith burdened by the recent disclosure of the immense time the creation has taken, ought not even the modest scheme in Genesis to have raised the same difficulty ?

Why should it take God six days to create the world, even if they were only six literal days ? However impossible and mistaken it may be to attempt to equate geological order as disclosed to us by science with the picturesque opening chapters of Genesis, it should be noted that Genesis, like science, gives us an orderly succession, which is at least remarkable.

But it is probably in the slowness of human progress where the pressure is most felt. We can rule out the pre-human stages altogether, for time has no meaning and no problem any weight until man arrives at the mental condition when he can be sensible of them. But even suppose that the relics of civilisation must be dated at 7000 years ago, we must inquire what kind of life man lived in the interval between that date and a million years ago, when the human species is believed to have emerged. Perhaps we imagine an upward struggle through misery and savagery more cruel than anything known to present existence ; man for a million years with no knowledge of God, or of why he was here in this world, or even with that idea, which some take now to be a sufficient explanation of existence, that we are contributing something towards the future of the race. But all this is indeed pure imagination. It assumes that prehistoric man is bound to have been unhappy, and that he had no light

on the meaning of life. We cannot, of course, enter into his mind, for he has left us no record of his thoughts; nevertheless, we know some things about prehistoric man, from which others can be inferred. For instance, he could often draw with accuracy and lifelike power; and he was generally firmly convinced that he was going to live again beyond the grave. In more primitive burials the skull is found broken, and it might be thought that this was a sign of some cruel practice; but the skull was in reality broken in order to let the soul out. Primitive man may have had curious notions of the soul, but at least he believed he had a soul. He was also often buried in a crouching position, like the fœtus in the womb, and it has been conjectured that this indicated the belief that he was going to be born again; anyhow, it is certain that he was buried in the hope that he was going to live again. It is more than probable, also, that he had some conception of God, for his art was not play; it was a form of prayer, a pictorial petition to God. Indeed, it is not primitive man, but modern man, living in cities between the years 1914 and 1919, in civilised Europe, and mostly without God, that is the problem for faith.

These suggestions begin to show where relief is to be found. First of all, it must be remembered that time is part of the scheme

of creation, and does not exist apart from or beyond creation ; the philosopher will tell us, therefore, that time cannot be applied to the conception of God, for God is above time. This is not a truth of revelation only or strictly a truth of revelation at all ; it is a conception to which philosophy is driven simply by the exercise of reason. " One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day," is only a scriptural picture of the philosophic idea that with God there can be no before or after, but only an ever-present now. The philosopher, moreover, will tell us that eternity is not simply an endless extension or multiplication of time ; for no multiplication of time is equal to infinity which is a timeless form of being. However difficult it may be for us to realise this, and perhaps it is only possible to the philosophical mind, if it is true, it rules out some questions in our problem as mistaken : the question, for instance, sometimes raised, " Why did God not create the world before ? " to which the answer is, " With Him there was no before." This answer may be difficult for some to grasp, but an illustration may help. In the fourth century, when they were discussing the person of Christ, the Arians maintained that Christ was a created being. But they were not so foolish as to say,

" There was a *time* when He was not." That would have betrayed them too completely into the hands of their opponents. They carefully avoided this by saying, " There was when He was not." Or, again, if we ask why God took so long to create the world, the answer is, " ' Long ' has no meaning for God." But there is a psychological approach to this difficult philosophical conception which is perhaps possible to us all. We have advanced towards it a little by reminding ourselves that there is no more problem in God taking billions of years to create the world than in His taking six days. The problem is why He should take any time at all. Therefore there is also no more problem in a man existing a million years ago without the light of the Christian revelation than in his existing without that light 5000 years before Christ was born. These problems ought not to have emerged or pressed upon us so heavily only since the discoveries of science ; they ought to have occurred to men whenever they considered the question of time.

Again, and a much more important point : whatever of struggle, physical or moral, man's upward path has entailed, the intensity of this struggle must not be multiplied by the number of years over which it was spread. Why not ? Because, psychologically considered, time is

never any longer than life seems to a single human consciousness. You cannot say, " Because I have lived fifty years, and my father lived thirty years before me, therefore somebody has lived for eighty years." Things are here being added together illegitimately. Nobody has, of course, lived longer than his own life ; but there is no consciousness that embraces the summated lives of generations of men, save, of course, the consciousness of God ; and even life itself cannot be measured, as we know, by mere length of days. And this relief is not due to a philosophical quibble. If we ask for a scientific description of this " time " which so burdens our faith we shall find it seems to vanish under analysis. Time is a process of measurement, and clock-time is the measurement of movement over regular intervals of space. We are always setting our clocks by more accurate time ; but what is called absolute time is only a mental ideal, to which all our mechanical efforts only approximate, and which even the heavenly bodies do not keep. And when we go further and ask science what exactly is the time which we try to measure, science cannot answer. By " time " we generally mean the measurement of time, but what the time is that we measure nobody knows. You can attempt the problem for yourself : it is an interesting exercise

for the mind. If clock-time is the measurement of motion over space, then suppose we take away motion and then take away space, what is the thing we measure ? Nobody knows ; it does not seem to be in itself anything at all. Time only comes into existence with motion, so that where there is no change there seems to be no time. That is why the scholastic theologians, often to the confusion of moderns, tell us that eternity must be changeless, for any change would reduce eternity to time. Moreover, eternity is a form of intensity and not a form of extension. We must say that it never ends, but we shall only mislead our own imaginations if we say it goes on for ever, for that might convey the impression that its duration might be tedious. Eternity is not long : it is deep. It is all that time measures brought to a point.

Yet created time must have a purpose. Time is no more necessary to God than creation is necessary to Him, nor is continued time necessary to creation. The moment God created, He made time, but if creation were perfect and unchanging it would be again timeless, save in its origin. But time may be necessary to the thing created. This distinction can be brought out by examining two other conceptions where time is reckoned to be inapplicable. The Early Church in

maintaining the eternal nature of the Son of God, as contrary to the Arian view, swiftly came to the conclusion that if the Son was not created but begotten, then He must have been begotten eternally ; God could not *create* God, therefore the Son must be like the Father, uncreated. Then in mediæval times theologians were much engaged with the idea of the angelic creation. This was not to them a merely interesting speculation, concerning which we might conclude nothing would be known, but it enabled them to set over against humanity, and over against the eternal Son of God, a third order of being. The eternal Son was uncreated and was God from all eternity. The angelic order was created in time, but was created perfect, and therefore the angels are changeless ; the fallen angels being supposed to have fallen the moment they were created. All this may appear to us baseless as a too-finely-drawn speculation ; but its value for our present purpose is that it enables us to understand by contrast the creation of man. Man was created with the intention of raising him to divinity through union with God. Therefore, to be raised above what he was created, there had to be change, and where there is change, there is time. And since man's elevation to divinity must be accompanied by his understanding

and by free acceptance of his destiny, for man, time must be a long time.

This may explain the necessity for time, and man's consciousness of time, but why was there pre-human time ? Why were there ages before man existed ? Why was not the world-machine created perfect at once, and man placed in it when it was ready ? A satisfactory answer is difficult to find, and the one here put forward is perhaps original and cannot therefore carry the weight of a tested and agreed consideration. It is that the imperfections in the machine were necessary in order to awaken man to a purpose beyond the machine and to train him for the gaining of a complete spiritual supremacy and freedom ; so man is placed in the world before the creation of the material universe is quite finished. Hence glacial epochs, earthquakes, and imperfect conditions. Man is placed in a changing universe, and a changing universe must be an imperfect universe. Its change and movement, as it were, grind out of his soul the conceptions of perfection and eternity and so bring him to the idea of God. Moreover, a long time was necessary, over which these changes were spread, for man freely to co-operate in bringing into existence a sufficiently large number of the human species necessary to their union with God.

Now, the pre-human life of the earth before man appeared, and the pre-organic period of the universe, when life had not yet emerged, may have been necessary to carry back even into the material universe the same principle of some element of existence-for-self in all things, as well as some element of choice for all things. That is not a mere speculation; it is a scientific suggestion. The universe as a who, and the universe even with man and life abstracted from it, is not a dead machine, nor is pre-human life without some measure of free choice. Biology is driven to demand some direction, and therefore some choice for animal life, and mechanics is now beginning to demand it even for inanimate matter; there is nothing in the world which is purely mechanical. The behaviour of steel under stresses and strains reveals remarkable movements, and it has been discovered that the atom, which appears to us dead, is really alive with movement. The whole universe is in its degree alive, and the Creator has bestowed upon the meanest thing He has made a certain element, however infinitesimal, of something which seems to involve choice, namely, freedom of movement. Moreover, we know that life in this universe is always for the purpose of higher life. If it is true that man's physical frame has been evolved from

the animal frame, then the animal frame was for the purpose of the evolution of the human, and the pre-animate for the animate. It therefore becomes difficult to hold that man's life comes to an end with a finite existence, for then it must be admitted that the whole universe comes to a meaningless end, and it becomes more scientific to argue that man's life must be the basis for a higher form of life.

We must now turn to something that may seem to some to have a surer basis and a simpler explanation; though to them the preceding argument may have been necessary to prepare them for the considerations now to be presented. The New Testament is perfectly at home with these conceptions, and its profundity is only discovered when faced with these problems. It affirms that the *æons* were made through Christ. "Æon" is a Greek word meaning a "long time-period"; or it may mean "worlds"; and perhaps it sometimes means, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, both: the "space-time-motion" series was created through Christ. And St. Paul not only recognises cheerfully the æons which existed before the purpose of the world was at last made known in Christ, "the mystery which from all ages hath been hid in God, who created all things," but he looks forward as cheerfully to the ages to come which

will be necessary to manifest the inexhaustible riches of Christ. It looks as if St. Paul loved the very sound of " ages," and needed them as a background for his conception of the Christian scheme of redemption.

Christ, therefore, must be understood in a sense vast enough for such an agelong development of purpose. So we gather from revelation, and find it here fit in with what is derived from scientific measurement, that Christ is that eternal capacity and purpose in God from which all creation springs. Again, Christ is the law which is in all things, and which comes to light in human reason, the power which can discover what that law is. Once more, Christ was in the world before man, and He was in man before His Incarnation : " He was in the world, and the world was made through Him," even when " the world knew Him not." All the ages were preparing for man, and pre-Christian history was preparing for the Incarnation. The Incarnation reveals what the eternal purpose was, and reveals it to be eternal salvation in union with Christ. But that is not the end of our definition of Christ. Christ must be interpreted as the Eternal Son plus the humanity He has redeemed, for humanity is now " in Christ " united to Him as His body. St. Paul speaks of God's purpose being in

" the fulness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ." This term " in Christ " therefore must stand for the elevation of a redeemed humanity, brought from nothingness, educated through time to consciousness, carried beyond time into the beatific vision of God, and into personal participation in His infinite, glorious nature.

If that is the purpose of our universe, a vast process created in order to elevate man, who was nothing, through time, to be united to God for all eternity, that makes the existence of this universe with its ages of development infinitely full of meaning and infinitely worth while ; and it is the only purpose that does. There is no alternative that gives any meaning either to the size or the age of the universe, provides a satisfying consummation to human life, and is able to explain existence in a fashion that is adequate both to reason and to faith.

Chapter III *Christ and Mankind*

THE modern mind professes to find considerable difficulty in reconciling the Christian faith with secular facts. This is partly because the modern world pays much more attention to secular facts, which therefore crowd and press upon the mind, than to the realities of faith, which are invisible and demand the exercise of interior faculties which have come to be widely neglected. Nevertheless, it must not be imagined that there is any clean-cut division between secular facts and religious faith; faith builds ultimately on facts, and facts have no meaning save to some sort of faith. Neither must it be imagined that the modern mind constitutes a block resistance to faith. The modern mind embraces a vast confusion of ideas. This may be seen in the fact that what appears to one person as a difficulty of faith does not appear so to another. It is due to the make-up of our minds that some things weigh upon us more than others. To some the starry heavens are a hindrance to belief in personal religion. They find it hard to feel sure that a

God who is the author of that vast machine can be interested in individual souls. This is obviously due not only to inadequate conceptions of the mind of God, but to false conclusions concerning the construction of this machine, whose minutest perfections show a microscopic care, and whose vast workings after all produce and sustain persons. Further thought on this difficulty would therefore not only dissipate the difficulty, but through it rise to a more sublime conception and a greater trust in the power and care of the Creator.

But to the minds of others the immense antiquity of the universe and the slow processes by which the earth was prepared for human life cross the exalted conception of God's power which they might have attained by contemplating the heavens, because it seems to them that, compared with the older views of sudden creation, the vast vistas of time demanded by science seem to postulate a kind of impotence or ascribe a laborious method to the Creator. This difficulty can be diminished in some degree by the philosophical consideration concerning the place of time in the divine mind and the necessity of a slow process for the sake of man; it may even seem to confirm faith in a divine destiny for mankind and restore trust

in the careful condescension and infinite love of God.

But a further difficulty now emerges for some minds, a difficulty which is either felt instinctively or arises through intellectual considerations, but which burdens some minds, if possible, even more seriously than the two difficulties we have already examined, namely, the difficulty inherent in the vast multitudes which constitute the human race; for, bound up with that, there is the difficulty of the moral hindrance under which the great mass of humanity labours, and also the alarming problem of human increase, when we consider the future destiny of the world; which brings up such questions as birth control, where we shall find ourselves involved in one of the most heated controversies of the hour. This presents us with a practical problem of great difficulty and one likely to engage increasing attention, while it only seems to intensify the theoretical problem of how to reconcile the Christian doctrine of the soul with the apparently haphazard production of the human species. We can understand why herrings multiply at such a rate, because they are a very useful article of food; but, remembering that man has an immortal soul and yet seems to multiply in much the same way, it is difficult to under-

stand why it should be, and how such a process can be guided and regulated to a divine end.

This particular difficulty is felt equally by those who study anthropology and are thus compelled to review long stretches of history, and by those who are in actual contact with present conditions of human reproduction, especially as they are met with in the slums and crowded housing conditions of our great cities. The facts must be faced nakedly, without any evasion; but those of us who possess any faith ought to be able to face them, and if we accept Catholic theology, not only courageously but hopefully; because facts constitute the material of revelation, and behind all difficulties we may expect to find greater truth waiting for us, while in discovering the right attitude towards a problem like this we shall be helping humanity to work out its salvation.

Let us then, first of all, consider the quantitative burden of the human problem. It is difficult to procure actual and reliable statistics, but they certainly present immense figures. The recent population of the world has been estimated at 1,750,000,000; and in order to gain some idea of what that means by a comparison, we can recall that it is over ten times the number of the stars discernible by the

strongest telescopic photography. But according to modern anthropology the human race has existed as a separate species for a million years. No calculations have ever been attempted as to how many souls have therefore lived on this planet. It might be thought that the relatively small number existing at this advanced date disproves the immense antiquity of man; for at the present rate of increase one couple could produce the present population in less than 2000 years. What then could have been happening to the human race through a million years that its numbers are still so comparatively small? There is evidence, however, that the increase of humanity to its present number has not been by a steady geometrical progression; it could not have been so, or the population would have been immensely larger; the increase has taken place quite recently. It has been estimated from literary references that, at the time of Augustus, the world numbered 54,000,000 souls. From other sources it has been calculated that before the fifteenth century there were never more than 50,000,000 people in the world. These are only guesses at the best, though they may not be very far wrong; but from the stationary character of primitive races, and of even ancient peoples like those of India and China, which seem to have remained

at their present size for centuries, we can assume that over long periods of human history there has been a stable population, comparatively small. The number of human beings who have existed on earth is therefore nothing like so immense as our present population and the antiquity of man might at first seem to demand.

These numbers should not in themselves cause difficulty to any save those whose ideas of God are too narrow and anthropomorphic. If we measure God's concern by our own, then even to see a great mass of people would be a burden to our faith. Yet there have been remarkable instances of even thoughtful men feeling their faith shaken when they have for the first time come into contact with the teeming masses of the Eastern world. But it ought to be understood and remembered that it must take an immense number of human souls sufficiently to mirror or to enjoy the grandeur of God. The individual soul can take in only a fraction of God's glory, and therefore the only thing to do is to multiply man in order that through intercourse with one another something more of God's love and power may be appreciated. In the things of God the saints play the part which poets and artists play in interpreting the love of man and the beauty of the world. Intimate contact

with individuals should suffice to correct the impression which we often derive from congregated and congested masses of people, and help us to understand that every soul has values, spiritual needs, and possibilities which demand the measure of the infinite. In our crowded, busy, modern life few of us know many folk really well. We watch the crowd, swinging to and fro in the movements of a great city, and consequently form often false and contemptuous notions of humanity, because we see and know mankind only in the mass. This is a very bad way to know men: in fact, it is the way *not* to know them.

It is the immense and unprecedented increase of the human family in recent times which raises more disquieting reflections. This increase dates from quite modern times and is confined to civilised countries. For instance, the population of Great Britain has doubled in fifty years, and the world population can be expected to double in sixty years if the rate of increase between the years 1906 and 1911 is maintained.

To what is this sudden and amazing increase due? The stationary character of primitive peoples and of ancient civilisations was partly due to the ignorance of parents and the hardship of life. Savage peoples do not seem to know

how to feed and protect their children, and consequently it is assumed that in primitive times there was an enormous infant mortality. Among primitive peoples, especially warlike and wandering tribes, practices were deliberately adopted which were intended to harden children, and under this many must have succumbed. For instance, the Red Indians always washed their newly-born babies in perfectly ice-cold water, with the intention of killing off all but the very strong. With most primitive peoples, and even among ancient races, the practices of abortion and infanticide have been resorted to ; but since attempts at abortion were either ineffectual, because the method adopted was pure magic and simply did not work, or they were too dangerous to the mother, infanticide must have been the chief cause of the keeping down of population among primitive peoples, and it was sufficiently common to be effective. To put it quite bluntly, before the advent of Christianity, as it still is where Christianity is unknown, children were kept just as one keeps kittens : one or two were selected, the rest were killed. Christianity made one of the greatest social and economic differences to the world by its condemnation of the practice of infanticide, which it based upon the belief that every human soul contains the possibility

of enjoying eternal salvation. Yet, until the end of the Middle Ages, no great growth can be traced as due to the adoption of this idea; and that is because the old practices of infanticide and abortion, though largely dropped, were compensated for by the growth of disease. For disease is almost entirely a civilised thing; primitive people suffered very little from disease. But the practice of restraint also exercised considerable influence, and especially the wide adoption of celibacy, which, although known in other religions beside Christianity, under Christianity became so popular that it practically governed the civilisation of Europe and restricted the rate of growth right on to the end of the Middle Ages, though in some periods much more than in others.

It was almost coincident with the decline of celibacy that there came the rise of discovery and invention, and, following hard after, the industrial revolution; and it is the industrial revolution which has been mainly responsible for most of the increase in population. Exactly why it should have that effect is not clear. It is supposed to be due to the fact, otherwise confirmed, that the population always tends to keep pace with the possibility of sustaining it, however that regulation of the population is actually brought about. The

methods of regulation are diverse, obscure, and are generally unconscious. It seems to be a psychological more than a physical factor.

It is from the study of statistics, and from the discovery that growth is recent, that there arises the modern fear lest the population should now soon overtake sustenance ; for at the present rate of increase it is estimated that the world will be so crowded that there will soon be standing room only. It was Malthus who first raised this scare of over-population by his famous Essay on Population published in 1798 ; for before that time every one had concluded that the larger the population the better it was for every one. Malthus, however, argued that, since humanity multiplied by geometrical progression, while food multiplied only by arithmetical progression, the world must sooner or later be brought to starvation. The theory that food increases only by arithmetical progression has since been entirely disproved, and a recent writer has declared that, with the application of modern skill and invention, there is almost no limit to the scientific production of food ; though whether food produced scientifically would be quite so good as food naturally grown, is a matter that is now creating considerable doubt and disturbance.

The alarm caused by Malthus soon died down, but it has been partly revived by the study of recent and more accurate statistics, which show that the present rate of increase is not the highest possible; in some places and under some circumstances it is not the highest actual rate, while if it is simply maintained at its present increase it is estimated that in a hundred years the population of the world will have reached 5200 millions; which, according to some calculators, will be the utmost limit this world can sustain. That is to say, a hundred years from now the population problem will have reached a stage absolutely critical for the further continuance of humanity. It therefore seems necessary that in the interests of the race some regulation must be adopted, and it is being demanded that the knowledge of the most satisfactory method of artificially limiting the number of births should be spread, especially among the lower classes, who multiply more rapidly, and for obvious reasons tend to produce an inferior stock. The higher classes, from one cause or another, are already under-producing, while the lower classes are still over-producing.

Now, these proposals raise serious difficulties for moral and religious people. There

is a deep-seated Christian instinct against artificial restriction. According to the Christian doctrine it is obvious that the more souls that can be created the better: it means making heaven populous. The method of regulation known as contraception arouses suspicion, because it separates the pleasure from the purpose of sexual intercourse, undoubtedly interferes with the ordinary course of things, and appears to be contrary to instinct, nature, and morality. It is replied to this that the artificial prevention of conception is no worse than nature's waste of life. It is argued that it is an advance upon abortion and infanticide, and it could be pleaded that it has always been adopted in some form or another, but it has been practised unscientifically and with uncertain results. It is at the same time affirmed that the only alternative of marital abstinence is physically impossible and psychologically dangerous.

No full discussion of this problem can be attempted in this place. In the face of our acquiescence to far worse sins, the general repudiation of religious authority, and the absence of faith, it is foolish to condemn contraception as the worst of sins and as something in the nature of a crime. Nothing will be gained for what is obviously the higher

ideal by the refusal to recognise that it is an ideal which is not only high but hard for our generation. Neither will general laws suffice to decide all possible individual cases. In default of a full examination of the whole subject, we shall have to content ourselves with general considerations. And the first of these must be in the nature of a mere prediction, though confidently made, that when the whole subject has been thoroughly and scientifically investigated, and confirmed by the results of experiment, the Christian instinct will be found to be absolutely confirmed. At present, it should be remembered, people are plunging in and interfering with matters that have previously been regulated by instinct, and interfering with processes which are still little understood. For instance, if the present propaganda for artificial birth control is allowed to go on, it will certainly for a long time to come operate, not to decrease the lowest stock, but only to diminish further the higher stock; so that the very disparity which some are anxious to remedy will only be accentuated; for the lower classes will certainly for many years to come propagate more rapidly and the higher classes less rapidly. It will certainly tend to increase sexuality, by removing the last and most effective restraint, and we have sufficient evidence that civilised man is already

sexually abnormal; for he is much more sexual and irregular than primitive man. It will add further to the accidental character of birth, the very thing which already makes such a difficulty to faith. Children will more than ever be due to accident; for there is no absolutely certain way of contraception. And more than faith will suffer: as faith declines, the full responsibility for birth will be placed upon the parents, and this will hardly improve the attitude of children, already becoming very rebellious against being dragged into a purposeless existence. It will still further lower the precarious ideals of love; and it will be still more difficult to retain its naturalness, purity, and beauty. Further psychological disturbances may be expected as the result of these practices, and there may be very serious and disastrous physical effects. These warnings must suffice.

We must now turn to other general considerations. It is difficult to believe that the actual increase of the population in recent times has been due to a deliberate aim. For instance, if the coming of the industrial revolution made the possession of a large family by a working man a financial asset, and therefore working men as a whole increased the size of their families because it was profitable to

do so, it would have to be assumed that they had previously as deliberately restricted the size of their families; whereas they had no knowledge of how to do this. The fact is, there is a curious psychological law governing the fertility of life. For instance, during a war more boys are born than girls, when normally the numbers are about equal. Again, it is a fact that the raising of the standard of life brings about a smaller productivity. If you only lift the standard of life to a certain level of comfort, then the same numbers are not produced; and this not simply through deliberate restriction. Therefore it would seem that while we are still in the dark about the operation of other factors, the raising of the standard of life should be tried rather than embark upon a method which is uncertain in its success and likely to be disturbing and dangerous in its effects. Seek a system which would bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth; make the intellectual, æsthetic, and moral elevation of the people the one great aim of all private and corporate concern; these will be found to be the best indirect methods of restriction. There are other forces, besides the deliberate use of contraceptives, at work among the more thoughtful section of the population, which either by advising restraint, or actually

diminishing fertility, lower the rate of reproduction. The fact is that, with the elevation of the æsthetic and moral side of man, the merely sensual is governed or sublimated, instinctively and unconsciously. Over-production always occurs among the overcrowded, the degraded, the brutalised ; that is, among those who have no other absorbing interests but the sensual. Increase other interests, especially religious concern, and this matter will regulate itself. At any rate, these are perfectly sure and safe ways, and it is known that they act.

All this discussion can be summed up in the maxim that if we concern ourselves chiefly with the quality of human birth the quantity will take care of itself. Again, if only procreation could be regarded as an act of co-operation with the supreme purpose of God, the highest of all restraints would be combined with the purest of all desires. The greatest and most natural regulators of life are not physical but psychical, and the greatest psychical instinct is religion ; and that is why, the moment religion goes, we have to bring in all sorts of artificial regulations and prohibitions which only add to the burden and confusion of life, generally with but little effective result. For instance, if religion teaches men that avarice is a most dangerous sin, which corrodes

the soul and leads to eternal misery, that will prove to be a greater regulator of wealth than any of the sumptuary and restrictive laws that legislators can devise. When you have got rid of the priest you have to call in the policeman.

If there were no guiding purpose and no eternal destiny for mankind, then this question would be not only alarming ; it will be found insoluble, and the future of mankind must be viewed with the greatest apprehension and dismay. If faith fails, humanity will find itself engaged in a ferocious struggle for existence, and a hundred years from now life will be made intolerable, personally, sexually, and economically.

But the question that may now arise is how we are to reconcile the eternal purpose for souls with the manner of their physical begetting ? This high spiritual purpose is chained to an almost irresistible physical impulse which often seems unworthy of it. The harshness of this contrast between the spiritual and the physical can, however, be softened by the recognition that human love and animal appetite are never the same thing, however much they may necessarily be combined, and that it is a help to faith to admit that some dislocation has taken place in humanity, which theology calls the Fall ; for, however, wherever, and whenever

that took place, it is obvious that something like a fall has overtaken man, since even the nature it is believed he inherits from the animals has been perverted. The animals live a much more regulated physical life than man. In throwing off his allegiance to the will and purpose of God man has naturally done most serious injury to that very instinct of reproduction by which we partake of the very prerogative and power of the Creator, and the consequent weakening of the will produces a perversion of the sexual instinct, and invests its exercise with a strange but ineradicable psychological effect of shame.

But it is the haphazard, careless, criminal begetting, as well as the gross inequalities which differentiate human birth, which seem to preclude any purpose worthy of being called divine. It must be remembered, however, that many compensations are at work, even in this present life, which hinder the crimes of the parents having full effect upon their children. It is an interesting fact that Catholic theology, after a long controversy between the Creationist and Traducian theories on the origin of the soul, has come down, though not even yet dogmatically, on the side of Creationism, that is that children derive their souls from God and not from their parents ; therefore the

acts of the parents do not determine the soul. Again, it is held that when this confused life is over, the life of the world to come will adjust and compensate absolutely for every hindrance and deprivation men have suffered ; for not age, race, colour, opportunity, intellect, not even moral attainment, will determine a person's condition in the spiritual world, but only the capacity for God ; and the capacity for God is determined by the desire for something higher than one possesses, at whatever stage one may be. This needs to be emphasised by a concrete illustration. Let us suppose some poor savage without any light of faith yet longs greatly to be something better than he is, and suppose that some baptized Christian, enlightened with true knowledge, and having access to all the ordinances and sacraments of his religion, spends very little time in intensifying spiritual desire ; there is much more hope for that savage than for that Christian in the world to come. It is the difference between what one is and what one desires to be that creates the capacity for God. Christians often forget that their superior advantage does not constitute enlarged capacity for God ; it presents them with potentiality, but only that ; and with increased responsibility for its realisation. But external compensations must not be pressed to such a degree that the compensations in this present life and the

compensations in the life to come automatically bring all souls to spiritual equality ; for then the experience of earthly life we are called to go through would be worthless and the Christian salvation unnecessary. The working out of earthly condition and heavenly revelation may give to all such equality of opportunity, but there still remains the element of freedom which places ultimate responsibility upon ourselves. No one, however, will be lost through ignorance, lack of opportunity, or withholding of grace ; but only for deliberate, open-eyed rebellion.

We might be tempted to find relief to our problem in the idea that the earlier races existed for the sake of the later ; just as we may hold that animals existed for the sake of man ; and that the mass of the people exist for the sake of the few geniuses and saints which are thrown up from them. The Christian revelation teaches us that precisely the opposite is the truth ; it is the later races on this globe who exist for the sake of the earlier ; the Epistle to the Hebrews told us that long ago : " without us they should not be made perfect " ; and therefore the genius and the saint, according to the Christian explanation, exist for the sake of those beneath them. For Christian theology holds that while in the spiritual realm of heaven all souls are com-

pletely and perfectly happy whatever the degree of their vision or participation of God, there are nevertheless almost infinite degrees of perfection, and while union with God is only possible through complete response to Christ's revelation, the higher souls bring increase to the lower souls and make their perfection higher than it would be without them. We are bound to hold that without the Christian salvation the beatific vision and union with God would be impossible for man. But it is believed that the revealing vision of God is presented to every one after death, so that no final choice is made until a soul has seen God ; while every act of genuine contrition and love on earth will secure that that vision shall be beatific ; that is, fix the will for ever in happy contemplation of God. So there is room for almost infinite grades of conscious happiness extending from the highest saint, the Blessed Virgin herself, the chief glory of our redeemed humanity, down through every degree of sanctity ; through the grades of the angelic orders to the natural happiness which is possible to unbaptized infants, and still further to the lowest forms of animal life and existence ; all rejoicing in their capacity, and perfectly happy, and all deriving secondary bliss from the blessedness of others, and so all linked together in a chain of joy ; no

one and nothing outside, save those, if there be such, and we must admit there may be, who would be more unhappy in that light and company they would only hate.

Now, this view of human destiny explains why human life must go on until not only a sufficient number adequately understand and have appropriated the purpose of God here on earth, but until there is made certain the highest possible attainment of the greatest possible number in the world to come. It is the ambition to attain to spiritual heights in the next world, and the seeking of the Kingdom of God in this world, which provide the only adequate motives for personal and social existence. There is no other alternative reason for existence ever conceived or imagined which makes the suffering and struggle of earthly life worth while. It alone gives that protective sanctity to human life which sometimes we are willing to consider being taken from others, but which we are each very determined shall never be taken from us. After all, what are the real objections to infanticide? No merely racial purpose, no idea that the child might grow up to have a good time, provide a sufficient safeguard; but only this, that you may deprive a soul of rising to some great height of eternal bliss, and thus diminish the bliss of all souls.

And once we begin to tamper with the springs of human life, it may not be long before infanticide returns. There is evidence that infanticide, although so common in earlier times, and still found among savage tribes, is not really a primitive custom ; it is one of those perversions which come when life moves on from the primitive to a somewhat higher stage. We know that animals eat their young when kept in captivity, but that is due to the unnatural conditions of captivity, and is a perversion. And so, whenever infanticide occurs in humanity, we may safely regard it as a perversion. But when man surrenders either his instinct or his faith, perversions begin. Perversions are returning to faithless, civilised man. Some excuses for infanticide are already being suggested, and if we once admit the right to kill infants because some one thinks they are unfit to live, we should have no defence against the suggestion that old people should be killed off as soon as they get troublesome or useless, and it will only be another step to getting rid of healthy adults merely because we do not like them. In fact, it is already the only practical method some people propose for reforming the world.

The only natural and effective way of regulating the productivity of mankind to-

wards producing the spiritually best quality and quantity is the revival of faith in the future life; not in the popular form that this life is so dependent upon the next that this life and all it means is practically negligible, but in the true Christian form that everything in this life is important because our eternal condition depends upon this life, our conduct towards others, and the character we can gain from earthly experience.

Whatever difficulties there may be about applying the Christian explanation of existence to any individual soul here and now, those difficulties are due to the fact that only general principles can be laid down, and not individual applications, which would demand a separate revelation concerning every individual soul; nevertheless to abandon the wide principles and sane rationality of the Christian revelation would spell ultimate disaster, utterly destroy human hope, and would plunge mankind into inconceivable misery. Therefore our first duty is to accept for ourselves, and to persuade the whole world to accept, Christ: the underlying purpose and the goal of all earthly existence, and the means of its personal and racial realisation; and for the rest to trust every soul to God, believing that His judgments are just and merciful and that He will never

cease to be other than He is, the faithful Creator, the unfailing Sustainer, and the perfect Satisfaction of all that is, especially of man, His image and His glory, His child and His joy.

Chapter IV — *Christianity and the World's Religions*

ALMOST as great as the vastness of the universe, the antiquity of time, or the multitude of mankind, is the difficulty presented to faith in the variety of the world's religions. Where in this Babel is the voice of God? In this confusion who can claim that there is any clear guidance for mankind, or any basis for certainty on those supreme and ultimate questions on which man so needs illumination?

It is not enough to say that Christianity claims to be the one true religion and dismisses all others as false. Indirectly and in differing degree all religions do that; and even the claim that Christianity alone is a religion founded on the Incarnation of God, and therefore is alone adequately based or sufficiently satisfies human need, is challenged by some students of Comparative Religion. May it not be that the confidence of Christians is due to their almost exclusive concern with their own religion, their ignorance of what other religions claim and teach, and to the comparatively homogeneous religious complexion of

Christendom? Would not acquaintance with other faiths and contact with other living religions compel a revision of the Christian claim and considerably diminish any hope that Christianity could ever become the universal religion?

It is the new study known as Comparative Religion which has helped to force these questions to the front and thus raised new difficulties for faith. One student of the subject, Dr. J. Hope Moulton, ventured to predict that Comparative Religion would be the next battle-ground on which the claims of Christianity would have to be fought out. Now, this new study, for it can hardly claim to be a science, has collected and classified the practices of the most obscure faiths and has ransacked the religious documents of the world, and in consequence has brought to light an immense amount of material, which, however, it requires a rare mind to compass, and from which few are capable of safely drawing any conclusions whatsoever; but it has enabled those who care to be familiar with every variety of faith. The *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* provides almost more information about Buddhist and Hindu sects than about the varieties of the Christian faith. The religions of the world are now known and studied as never before. Just as the telescope has been

turned on to the heavens and has revealed the enormous number of the stars ; so, as it were, a microscope has been turned on to the world's religions, and there is no one of them, down to its minutest differentia, but is now intimately known to students. This constitutes a new addition to our knowledge, and it is not astonishing that it has had an effect almost as bewildering as that of the discovery of the multitudinous variety of the stellar universe. Already many conclusions are abroad, but it is evident that they are premature ; for they are various and contradictory. Some have concluded that all religions are now seen to be in essence the same, differing only in their form ; others, that all religion rests on a basis of crude superstition which vitiates it from the foundations upwards ; others especially, that Christianity can be paralleled in every point of alleged historical revelation, doctrine, ethical maxim, practice of worship, schismatic development, and is thereby dislodged from its supposed superiority ; others, that all religions manifest a dim groping after that which only becomes clear and adequately provided for in Christianity, and therefore that the other religions only confirm the claims of Christianity.

But amid this confusion some agreed and guiding facts emerge : first, the universality

and astonishing fertility of the religious instinct. Religion reveals itself to be one of the fundamental concerns of the human mind, wherever found and at whatever stage. Now, in the entire absence of any *visible* ground for faith, this alone is a most remarkable fact. Sometimes when we are tempted to wonder why men do not believe, we might equally well wonder why they do : because man as a whole does believe, and yet without anything that can be called compelling evidence. Secondly, even if it is held that all religions began in superstition, when this is found out—as at last it must be—superstition does not simply disappear, leaving nothing in its place ; it only gives place to a more reasonable and refined religion. The most advanced culture, the most complicated civilisation, and the most corrosive criticism still demand a religion of some kind ; and while these things subject faith to a stupendous and almost intolerable strain, it is under these conditions of culture, civilisation, and criticism that we get the purest and most progressive religion, held with clear conviction and propagated with enthusiasm. When all has been said that can be said about the anti-Christian elements in modern civilisation, it can be reasonably maintained that the most civilised countries of the world are the countries where Christianity is strongest.

If the decay of the religious instinct, with which temporary phases of human interest sometimes seem to threaten us, ever came about, it would almost destroy our understanding of the past, and would make a breach in human sympathy so great that we should no longer be able to learn anything from history. To deny that there was any reality corresponding to the religious ideas of the human mind would involve such a complete distrust of the human mind, as would undermine not only faith, but in the end all philosophy, all science, and all hope of finding truth or making real progress; and, indeed, the elimination of the religious instinct is now recognised to be a psychological impossibility, dangerous even to attempt. While one psychologist declares we must get rid of our religion before we shall ever find mental stability, another one declares that when a man gets rid of his religion he often develops the complex described as "God-Almightiness." When a man concludes that there is no God, he will imagine himself to be God; and that is a form of insanity. There have therefore been many attempts to find a substitute for religion, but these have only provided pathetic confirmations of its impossibility. An example may be quoted, first from the history of one of the greatest religions in the world, namely, Buddhism. Here what

started as an entirely non-religious and purely psychological method has developed into a characteristic religion with all the accompaniments of doctrines, cultus, and organisation. In the second place there may be quoted the complete failure of Comte's creation, the Religion of Humanity. This attempt, a sort of addendum to the negative side of Positivism, although modelling itself as closely as possible upon the Catholic Church, has been able to retain only an infinitesimal following, and has only one church even in a place like London. And if we can speak at all of the collapse of organised and established Christianity, which is at least rather an exaggerated description of the modern situation, this has only given rise to a swarm of cults, faiths, and movements, which however chaotic and confused they make the general situation appear, only illustrate the persistence of religious need. When the great gods go, it is only to make room for the little gods.

Again, it must be admitted that this modern interest in religion owes its inspiration almost wholly to one religion, namely, Christianity. If it be complained that Christianity is too exclusively concerned with itself, other religions are still more so ; there is no study of Comparative Religion under Hindu or Buddhist auspices. Therefore, conclusions hostile to

Christianity which have been drawn from Comparative Religion need to be checked by some preliminary considerations. This interest in other religions, which is supposed to be so damaging to Christianity, owes its initial inspiration almost solely to the modern enterprise of Christian missions, and Christian missionaries who are closely in contact with living religions are the least disturbed by them. Missionaries generally keep their faith much better than people at home who study the other religions mainly through documents and at a distance ; and, however crude and fanatical some missionaries may have been, those who know would recognise that it has been an extraordinarily educative enterprise and has produced men of whom any empire and any science might be proud ; while it was these same often despised persons who began the sympathetic study of other faiths, and half the material collated has to be taken on the good word of missionaries ; they are acknowledged to be the finest students of the very religions they propose to sweep out of existence.

The hostile and alarming conclusions drawn from the facts brought to light by this new study, for all that we owe to their careful classification, come in the main from those who not only study the subject second-hand, but who are often outside of, and confessedly

out of sympathy with, all religions. It really is not a good preparation for the study of religions to have no sympathy with any one of them ; and some have obviously pursued this study with the definite purpose of challenging the supreme claim of Christianity. Moreover, the revival which has come to some of the ancient faiths in modern times, and which is partly responsible for their even being considered by us, is due to their contact with Christianity, and an endeavour to embrace something both of its faith and its works. That is particularly true of Buddhism, Hinduism, and, as we shall see, even of one sect of Mahommedanism.

Even if the whole matter were viewed quite externally and objectively, Christianity can provide some practical evidence that its dreams of supremacy are not hopeless. If statistics are of any value in an issue like this they are available, and may appeal to some as nothing abstract or idealistic would. In a world population which in 1910 was calculated at 1560 millions, according to *The Catholic Encyclopædia* the adherents of the different religions are estimated as follows : they begin with Christianity calculated at 618 million followers, next come Confucians with 240 millions, Brahmins are estimated at 210 millions, Mahommedans 206 millions, Buddhists 125

millions, and Jews 14 millions, while unclassified heathens are put down as numbering 140 millions; Christianity therefore leads with nearly three times as many as the religion that comes next. It must be admitted that the Christian figures indicate only nominal adherents; but that is the case with all the other figures. Moreover, in comparison with other missionary religions, the growth of Christianity is a sufficiently remarkable thing after 2000 years. We often exclaim somewhat pathetically, "After two thousand years!" when we are considering the advance of true Christianity; but 2000 years is a very short time in which to do anything with our humanity. The progress of Christianity contrasts favourably with that of other religions, even with Mahommedanism, which is extraordinarily propagandist, but which despite great successes is after 1300 years still only fourth on the list, with but one-third of what Christianity at present numbers. Moreover, the number of Christians who have been won inside the areas covered by other religions is now 5 millions; and here at least the numbers are rather exact, for the conditions are exacting. And these numbers are the result of hardly more than a hundred years of sustained and energetic missionary effort.

These figures tell us very little about the

future prospects of Christianity, because of the critical and changing conditions to which systems of thought in the world are at present peculiarly subject; but it is almost certain that the other religions, whatever may happen to Christianity, will be disintegrated under the touch of civilisation and the blight of modern scepticism. Scepticism is touching China, and to a less degree India, and in China some observers believe that it has already reached a point at which it has become a life-and-death struggle between Christianity and atheism. One is speaking, of course, only of the student population, not of the mass of the people, but it is the students who count for the future. Hinduism has rallied itself to meet the challenge of Christianity, but there national and economic movements for the moment confuse the issue. Whatever we may think of the movement headed by Mahatma Gandhi, it is claimed that one result of it has been to make the name of Christ one of the most popular names in India. This Indian leader is reputed to have but two pictures in his room; one of the Crucifixion, and the other of Christ Washing the Disciples' Feet; while the result of his imprisonment was almost to sell out the stocks of English Bibles in India, a larger number having been sold in a few months than in fifty years before. It must be admitted that

the tendency at the present moment is to adopt Christ simply as a Teacher, perhaps for political motives, and no doubt apart from and in opposition to the Western interpretation of Christ, but nevertheless it is a momentous fact that the name of Christ is to-day perhaps the most influential name in India to which men can appeal.

As far as intellectual and political leadership is concerned, China has apparently determined to abandon her own religion. Many of her leaders are already Christian, although an issue is now sharpening between Christianity and revolutionary atheism. The issue between the traditional religion and scepticism has been more or less decided in Japan; for though the Japanese Government has expressed itself willing to recognise Christianity alongside two other religions as the established religion of their country, educated Japan is mainly agnostic. Of the students in Tokyo University 90 per cent. were recently reported to be agnostic. The great masses of the East may still decide the issue, and they may maintain the ancient beliefs, as many predict they will: once more the East will bow its head to the Western storm but remain still the same. All these new invasions and reactions of thought may be swallowed up in the old religions, but it does look, as far as one can

judge, as if Eastern immobility were broken at last.

The attitude of Mahommedanism is more unyielding, but there scepticism is doing its remorseless work. The Young Turks are not Mahommedan; they also are at heart agnostics. It looks, therefore, as if within a few hundred years at most it will be Christianity or no religion for the Eastern world, and if the deeper instincts of man decide, the latter is an exceedingly improbable alternative. Indeed, the social solidarity and instinctive religiousness of the East may save the world situation for Christianity, even if anarchic individualism brings about in the West, as some fear it may, ultimate rejection. But the observation of Western conditions need not give ground for despair if only it is recollected that it was precisely similar conditions that Christianity had to face and finally conquered when it first entered the world; in the Roman Empire the conventional and established religion had collapsed, and a swarm of competing cults were already in the field. There was really nothing to favour Christianity, and there was no room for another religion. It came into a world which had been saturated with religion, and, in addition, a world as sceptical as, and with more reason than, our own.

The next point to be considered is that all the great religions have discernible approximations to Christianity. We may leave aside heathenism and Judaism ; but the idolatry of the one and the Messianic hopes of the other both indicate man's craving for a visible representation of God.

Hinduism, the old Brahmin religion, is strongly pantheistic. It teaches that personal existence is a chain and a delusion from which man should strive to free himself and be reabsorbed in the impersonal reality of Brahmā. But another stream of thought has arisen since the Christian era, which is generally called Bhakti-marga, a religion which encourages personal devotion to Vishnu the Bhagavat, or Adorable, who is believed to be the manifestation of Brahmā, and who has had a series of earthly incarnations, twenty-four in the fullest system, of whom Rama and Krishna have been the chief, while one, who will be the best, is yet to come. Krishna is undoubtedly an historical hero, Rama less certainly, but at any rate the latter is lost in mist and the former is unworthy of close moral imitation. But neither historicity nor morality matters very much to Hindu thought ; it is the *idea* of incarnation and the attitude of love towards the supreme Deity which are all that matter. In the Bhakti-marga system,

Krishna and Rama are merely names by which you can call God when you want to speak of or to Him : they have no real personal content or character.

Buddhism is a religion that has gone through a most unexpected and significant development. Buddhism as a conscious system took its rise in Gautama's experience of redemption acquired through the cessation of interior desire, and is a purely psychological method of securing freedom from the chain of existence, involving no necessary dependence upon belief in God, the identity and continuance of the soul, or the efficacy of religious practices. It could be, and perhaps was, taught as compatible with atheism ; and yet consider into what it has developed. The founder has been gradually deified. He has come to be regarded as the manifestation of an eternal, ideal Buddha ; or there are believed to be many heavenly Buddhas who produce earthly counterparts, Amitabha being the heavenly Buddha who was the archetype of Gautama. Other Buddhas are to be expected on earth : Maitreya, of whom Gautama was merely the harbinger, and who is yet to come, and last of all Amitabha will come again as Prince of Peace. This all sounds somewhat complicated, but this outline is a great simplification of the system as actually developed. In addi-

tion, Buddhism has developed monasticism, ceremonial worship, the use of images, especially of Gautama; while in Thibetan Buddhism we meet with a kind of sacrament, and a hereditary manifestation of the Buddha in the Dalai Lama, who is a kind of papal head to a complicated hierarchy. Indeed, in so many respects does it resemble Catholicism that it is often called Catholic Buddhism. The Nestorian Mission probably accounts for some of the more striking resemblances.

There can be little doubt that the Buddha himself neither taught nor contemplated any of these developments. Some of the developments even of orthodox Buddhism may be due to later Christian influence; but, anyhow, the development is a remarkable example of impressible religious instinct demanding a theology and a worship. If any one proposes to start a new non-theological and non-worshipping religion it might save time to consider that it has been tried before. The advance of Buddhism on Bhakti Hinduism is in the undeniable historicity and the attractive personality of Gautama himself, a humble, loving, and saintly soul. The Buddhist ethics have in many points a close correspondence with Christianity, especially in the fundamental idea that self must be surrendered, while it has even outstripped the popular understanding

of Christianity in its pacifism and its kindness to animals ; but it must be remembered that these welcome characteristics are to be traced to the fear of active desire and to the belief in transmigration rather than to positive love ; for even love in the Buddhist system would only bind the soul to the wheel of existence, which it is the one object of Buddhism to teach men how to escape.

Mahommedanism definitely includes a number of Jewish and Christian elements, though in a corrupted form. It regards Jesus as a virgin-born prophet, who is to come again as Judge ; but Mahommedanism maintains a hard opposition to the idea that God could have a son, and therefore rejects the very idea of an Incarnation. But even that dogmatic resistance has been undermined by two unorthodox movements which have sprung up from within. These movements have developed in spite of dogmatic repression and bitter persecution ; for Mahommedans not only persecute anybody outside their own faith, but, like other vital religions, any one who is unorthodox inside. The two unorthodox sects who now concern us are the Sufis, who incline to pantheistic conceptions, and more particularly the Shiites, who maintain something in the nature of a Messianic hope. This hope has historically taken the

form of a belief in twelve Imams, or special revelations of God in a human person. The first of these was hailed in the Prophet's nephew, and the last withdrew from the world in A.D. 873, with which, however, he kept up communication through a series of persons called Babs, or "gates." The last Bab died without successor, and this condition of things has persisted for a thousand years, but now the Shiah hope has been revived in our own times. In 1844 there appeared in Persia, Mirza Mahomed Ali, claiming to be the Bab and to be preparing the way for the Imam. Eventually he let it be known among the inner circle that he was himself the expected Imam, though later on he indicated one of his followers as the Imam, till he was killed by his enemies, when the Bab resumed the claim. He died in 1852, designating his son as his successor; but the younger brother resisted this claim, thus causing a schism, and especially when he announced himself as "He whom God should manifest"—in short, as the Imam. His son Abdul Beha carries on the claim, but only as the Bab, and has received some degree of welcome in the Western world, particularly in America, where the Behai movement is established as a gentle universalism, professing to reconcile all religions by a simpler interpretation, and

now seems likely to degenerate into a kind of theosophy.

The significance of these examples is to be found in their extraordinary approximations to Christianity. These phenomena have given rise to various speculations: that these religions have borrowed from Christianity; or that Christianity has borrowed from them; but more generally that all religions follow a psychological law of rise and development, which constitutes their only claim to truth and reality; and in this estimate Christianity must share; it is but one of a type, though more completely developed because it has been subject to more conscious and rationalising processes. On this basis not even the claims made for Christ can be allowed to be unique: all religions tend toward the idea of incarnation; there have been many Christs. For in addition to the parallels produced from the three great religions, almost endless parallels can be quoted from the mystery religions, from Egypt, from Asia Minor, and from Rome, of an incarnate, dying, and risen God; while stories and customs from all religions provide extraordinary coincidences, extending from the Virgin Birth through Gospel incidents to sacramental practices, with the Christian faith.

Before we examine these alleged parallels

more closely, we may notice briefly the various interpretations which have been put upon the evidence they yield. All religions have been reduced to the level of the myths embodied in the mysteries, which are vegetation myths, personifications of the rise and fall of nature, through sympathetic observance of which man sought the assurance of immortal life in union with God. The myths are in short poetic phantasies; and religious observances, ceremonial, sacramental, or the more rationalistic representation in oratorical preaching or extempore prayer are but attempts at psychological realisation. It is therefore interesting to notice that the "new psychology" would reduce all religion to a poetic phantasy. But the attempt to reduce Buddha, and then Christ, to a myth, has proved impossible and has only provoked the ridicule of competent scholars. The original teaching of Gautama, about which there is little disagreement, has been successfully disentangled from the later developments of Buddhism, and so a similar process seems possible in regard to Christianity and Christ. Criticism has been at work on Christian origins, and, as a consequence, Jesus has been reduced to a saintly prophet of simple faith in God, while the doctrine of His Godhead, the establishment of a Church, monasticism, sacramentalism, mysticism, and the rest, are believed

to be due to the same processes which overtake all religions if they live long enough. Leaving aside even detailed refutations of those critical conclusions, it suffices for our purpose to call attention to the fact that it is evidently quite impossible to prevent this process; and therefore, even on this hypothesis, it must be admitted that Christianity is the most perfect development, and in a conscious and rational form, of this process, which has here attached itself to a person eminently suitable for being clothed with the incarnational idea. But it does not seem possible to detect when this process actually was applied to the person of Jesus, and so the whole process might be regarded as a revelation of God working through the conscious necessities of the human mind. This was the position taken by the modernist, the Abbé Loisy, who traced the whole of the Catholic development to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, until this doctrine, being condemned by the Pope, led Loisy to embrace what seemed to him the only alternative of virtual atheism. Harnack still seems to hesitate as to whether this process can be separated from the historical Jesus, or if so, whether it is to be regarded as in any sense a divine process.

But before we commit ourselves to any of

these conclusions some pointed distinctions have to be noted in these too hasty hypotheses. It is much easier to secure scholarly agreement that Buddha's teaching was opposed to the later developments of Buddhism, and that Krishna was unworthy of the incarnation idea, than that Christianity is a false development of the teaching of Jesus, or that Christ is unworthy of being regarded as in any sense an incarnation of God.

Scholarship is still engaged in fighting this battle, but the result is hardly in doubt; for just as criticism has now established the historicity of the Buddha, and is inclined to read back to him a good many germs of the later development of his religion, so criticism is compelled to antedate Catholic Christianity earlier and earlier, and to admit that Christ claimed in essence what the Church has claimed for Him.

Moreover, the incarnational idea in Christianity needs to be distinguished from that found in other religions. In all other religions there is always a considerable gap still remaining between the supreme Deity, who is the background of existence, and His manifestations. Nowhere is it claimed that the Incarnate is of the same substance as the Godhead; the supreme Deity is so abstract and impersonal that no human person can be identified with it

without ceasing to be, as the Buddha actually did when he entered Nirvana. Again, the idea appears in the other religions not as an incarnation in a single person, but as a series of incarnations, which shows that the idea is not being taken seriously; it is either combined with a very confused conception of personality, where the human personality is itself not permanent, as in Buddhism and Hinduism; or it is lowered to the level of a mere function which can be transferred or inherited, as in Babism. Sometimes the great Bab declared he was incarnate, sometimes he declared somebody else was; whereas there is no trace in Christianity of the idea that John the Baptist was the Incarnate, or indeed that any one else but Jesus Christ was the Incarnation of God. The Christian idea of incarnation, whether true or not, makes it an absolutely unique and unrepeatable act. First, it was an Eternal Person who was incarnate; and, second, the personality created by the assumption of humanity remained unchangeable, able to return in glory, but never able to be incarnate again, for the simple reason that He is incarnate for ever.

This Christian conception of incarnation alone gives an unmistakably personal and permanently identifiable revelation of God. It cannot be spread over a number of persons;

and thereby it reveals its sense of the permanence of personality ; while the revelation of God is not confused by a succession of inadequate and contradictory personalities. Cults which play about with a series of incarnations under Christianity cannot know much of other religions, or they would realise that they are simply attempting to kill Christianity. But there is little disagreement among those who have been willing to compare Christ with others, as to the sole, or, at least, the supreme suitability of His personality for the idea of Incarnation, even if they might still dispute whether there has been, or could be, an incarnation. They would admit that if there *has* been an incarnation, then Christ would merit such an explanation ; for the suitability of His character as a revelation of the character of God is almost undisputed.

From the vast and amorphous heap of facts which Comparative Religion has accumulated, we have related only those which approximate to the Christian idea of the Incarnation ; for this is the most important point at issue. Other approximations need to be distinguished in the same way, and none of them would even be discerned to be approximations to anything unless Christianity could be appealed to as a standard ; for it alone provides the clue we need even to clarify those religions. It is only

when Christianity emerges that we can see what the ideas in these other religions were groping after : they are ideas which Christianity at least makes clear, and satisfactorily embodies in an historic and entirely suitable person. The other religions seem to be groping their way to a light they can feel but cannot see ; they stammer what Christianity speaks out clearly.

There seems, therefore, but one inevitable conclusion to be drawn from a comparison of the world's religions with Christianity, and that sufficiently startling. The other religions are in the nature of an unconscious prophecy of Christianity : they crave what it alone can give ; they cannot provide it themselves, and in their confusion they lose even the idea ; they dream of what Christianity wakes mankind to behold as real. But what they crave is nothing less than a veritable incarnation, and therefore of a person worthy of such an interpretation. If Christianity has not an incarnation to give, then it does not even stand alongside the other religions of the world as one more craving, with no answer as yet forthcoming. Yet that craving is so strong that it will transform the most unlikely material, and if it can find no material it will invent it ; but Christianity at last answers the craving with its perfect fulfilment.

But it is obvious that it must be the Catholic form of Christianity which alone will satisfy this need, because it provides a rational theology which alone sanctions devotion. The moment it is proposed to part with theology, it is an indication that religion is taking the course of many of the older religions and is on the decline. Sacraments are needed to feed that devotion, and if religion does not provide sacraments then people will make them. It requires the apostolic succession in the Church, and the communion of saints, if what lies behind the craving for successive incarnations and the universalisation of religious experience is to be provided for. This Catholicism, no doubt, must be purified from any surrender to pagan ignorance, unethical substitutionalism and worldly compromise ; or stagnation and worldly corruption will overtake Christianity. This protection is provided in the standard of reference contained in the teaching of Christ. This full Catholic Christ can be taken to the heathen world as an enlightenment, and to the pagan world as a fulfilment. Already the Eastern world shows signs of turning to Him ; indeed, with such impetuosity that we must now see that it does not absorb Him too easily and thus engulf distinctive Christianity in its own all too hospitable systems. Christianity, in its full Catholic form, theological and sacra-

mental, can, however, absorb the world religions, and only as it absorbs them will they have an honoured place and make their permanent contribution to a universal religion.

Chapter V The Church and World Empires

THE question we are to consider under this subject of the Church and World Empires is the true relation between Jesus Christ and the kingdoms, states, and empires into which humanity is constantly organising itself; for He also claims a Kingship and an Empire, a sovereignty of love and an empire of truth. Does this claim conflict with the rule of empires, the right of kings, or the authority of the State? These are questions that may seem merely academic to many; for no logical solution seems possible, and everywhere compromise has had to be resorted to in order to secure contentment and stability for secular governments. But to those who are far-seeing, and who are watching the development of modern governments, this is one of the most fundamental questions affecting humanity's prosperity and progress; for the compromises which satisfy time-serving politicians only conceal forces which at any moment may come into open conflict, and are probably even now developing in directions which must eventually provoke a crisis and perhaps bring about the collapse of modern society.

It is probably the practical problems involved in imperialism which force this question to the front, because sooner or later imperial policy finds itself faced with the demand for self-government from some of its subject races, or its rule at some point awakens religious prejudices which it is bound to consider. But imperial ambitions often distract attention from home affairs, and an imperial race is rarely religious, and the problems that become acute through the necessities of Empire are problems which are really inherent to the very idea of the State. Therefore it is not merely as extended to an Empire that the State may find itself in conflict with the imperial claims of Christ, but even as a perfectly self-governed republic the State may find itself in conflict with the Church.

It will be the simplest method of approach to this subject if we inquire how this conflict between State and Church actually arose; for the practical problems that arise in connection with imperialism and religion are only an example, and a less fundamental one, of the same difficulty.

The friction between Church and State can be traced back as far as the theocratic ideal of the Hebrew nation. The original ideal of the Hebrew people was a theocracy, the immediate rule of God, under whose

inspiration prophets and judges interpreted the divine law ; the former as it affected the nation religiously and as a whole, and the latter as it affected the securing of justice for individuals. The later demand for a king was obviously regarded by the prophetic party as a mistake, which would only cause religious decline and bring about endless secular troubles. Nevertheless it was believed that God had granted these people a king in response to their prayers ; an example of the often overlooked truth that God may grant an answer to a prayer which nevertheless is not a perfect expression of His will, but which is granted because some great lesson may be thus learned, and because its evil may be overruled by Him for good. For not only was the king anointed by the prophets, but it was round this office of king that there gathered the Messianic ideal, and it was this Messianic ideal that Christ claimed to fulfil.

From the Hebrew and strictly religious point of view it therefore looks as if the kingship and all that kingship stands for is a temporary function, a condescension to human weakness and lack of faith, and is only to endure until the Messianic reign shall be established. It is beyond all imagination what would have happened to the Hebrew nation if Christ had been welcomed, and if His claims had been accepted by His people.

According to the Jewish interpretation the Christ would have endured for ever; but this is, of course, a hypothesis that it is simply fruitless to consider. It was something quite other that actually happened.

But the old conflict between the theocratic and secular ideals was only revived and accentuated by Christ's claims: at this point He came to thrust a sword into the very heart of earthly life. It has never been sufficiently considered by New Testament scholars what is actually involved in the claim that Christ makes as Messianic King; they have generally concluded that He only claimed a purely religious kingdom which at no point need come into conflict with secular politics. On this assumption the Crucifixion of Christ was merely a miscarriage of justice, wherein an entirely innocent person was put to death for making claims in which He had no interest, His condemnation being due to the envy of the Jewish authorities, who persuaded the Romans to put a construction on the Messianic claim which they knew Christ had never made; a device which did not mislead Pilate, but which his fear of further misrepresentation made him welcome. On this interpretation it must be held that Christ's defence before Pilate was merely a protestation of innocence, and that He must be acquitted of any kind of design

against the secular power. " My kingdom," He said, in answer to Pilate's inquiries, " is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight." This declaration has been taken, especially by Catholic expositors, to mean that Christ on the one hand repudiated all temporal claims, and on the other, that He sanctioned fighting as the means by which a secular kingdom is bound to defend itself. This interpretation seems at first sight to be in line with St. Paul's teaching contained in the Epistle to the Romans, of which the following are the relevant passages :

> " Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers " (xiii. 1).
> " The powers that be are ordained of God " (xiii. 1).
> " He beareth not the sword in vain : for he is a minister of God " (xiii. 4).

It has been pointed out that the power to which St. Paul here referred was actually embodied in the person of the Emperor Nero, which would seem therefore to sanction the worst of tyrannies; but modernist interpreters would take leave to wonder whether St. Paul would not have revised his judgment if he could have foreseen that it would be that very sword which would take off his head; and they would point out that the Book of the

Revelation takes an entirely different view of Nero and the imperial power ; for there Nero is almost certainly the Beast with the number 666, and the power against which the Lamb and His soldiers war is therefore the Roman Empire. Modernists have the great advantage that they can make one text cancel another, whereas Catholic interpreters must reconcile them somehow ; though the more difficult method may not only require more patience, it may reach a deeper truth.

The Christian resistance to Rome was sharpened by the demand for a sign of loyalty which amounted to Emperor worship ; that was refused to the death, and it is admitted by secular historians that this was one of the means which brought the Roman Empire to an end. The martyrs overthrew the strongest empire that the world had ever seen, and their protest and its success have a significance that they probably never considered. But eventually Constantine succeeded to Nero and his Empire, and the implicit conflict was concealed for centuries, for Constantine borrowed the sanction of the Christian faith for the Empire and gave to the Christian faith the protection of the secular arm. Eventually there emerged the twin powers of the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy Catholic Church, and in the opinion of many students of history this only effected

a compromise which has been fruitful of corruption both in Church and State ; while since that day hardly anybody has been able to think clearly, or has even cared to think at all about the ultimate problem of earthly government and its relation to the claims of Christ.

Now, does the Catholic interpretation hold any real solution ? To answer that fairly we must be careful to separate the Catholic interpretation from its historical corruptions. The Catholic interpretation, while standing by St. Paul's teaching, as on its principles it must, that governments have a certain divine ordinance, nevertheless holds that this divine ordinance is not to be predicated of any kind of government. For instance, St. Thomas Aquinas, who may be taken as summing up Catholic thought, holds that a tyrannical government may be resisted without incurring the sin of sedition, and a tyrannical ruler may be deposed ; since tyranny is not for the common good, and therefore oversteps the province of government, which is the temporal happiness of its subjects. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, it is the tyrant, not the resisting people, who must be charged with sedition.

Again, while maintaining the supremacy of the Church over secular governments, modern Catholics at least would recognise that this

supremacy is purely spiritual: the sword held by the Church is the Word of God and no other; it ought never to have been, and must never again be confounded with political methods or secular power. All that is now asked, therefore, is that the supremacy of the Church is to be recognised by the State in the public acknowledgment of religion, in complete freedom being given to Christian worship and to the propagation of the faith, and in the encouragement of all that tends to foster morality; the rest the Church can itself look after.

The complication that is introduced into this theory since the split-up of the universal Church, by the practical difficulty of how the State is to recognise religion, is not the root cause of the problem. With the emergence of differing sects, with an Empire embracing, as does our own, other religions, the State recognition of religion becomes well-nigh impossible. It is always unjust to some of the sects, or to some of the religions, in the case of our own Empire; and the State as such is therefore compelled to be neutral; and with the growth of unbelief, which we may see pushed to much further extremes before very long, the State is compelled to treat religion as a purely private affair; but it does not seem to occur to any one that in this necessary adjustment

something very important has happened. What has really happened is this, that the original sanction of the State has gone; for the sanction of all government was originally based on some kind of divine right: that is, it was ruling by divine grace. The moment that has gone the authority of the State is undermined, and it must clutch at something which is no longer right, but might. It cannot recognise religion, it does not appeal to any divine right; and since any democratic government holds its office ultimately by the power possessed by a majority, there is a tendency to look to might as the only protection, sanction, and basis of the State. For it is not to be thought that the power of a majority is only exercised through the polling-booths; in the end this means that the majority rules because the majority can exert the greater force. This may rarely be apparent, but, in fact, it is the majority that has the power to enforce what happens, and it is this which makes its decision accepted; there the modern democratic State must find its sanction.

Now this idea of the State as resting on force was seen by the more logically minded Germans, and openly adopted by some of their State theorists, previous to the outbreak of the War, and it had long been sanctioned by German theology. Most of the advanced

critics and theologians of Germany had come to regard the Kingdom of Christ as a purely spiritual kingdom, whose laws were entirely inapplicable to earthly kingdoms, which have to be managed on entirely different lines. When this doctrine was openly avowed and brutally followed in war time it called forth indignation from the rest of the civilised world, and nearly all the nations organised themselves to resist the German claim.

But it is of the utmost importance to notice that this theory perforce underlies all modern States, though in a less conscious, and in an unconfessed way. It must also be pointed out to the nations which grew so indignant over this claim, that the only means they knew of overthrowing it was by an appeal to that very force which they denied to be the ultimate basis of the State. The defeat of Germany has not therefore proved that the German theory was wrong ; it has only proved she did not possess sufficient force. It must also be remembered that German Protestant theological opinion, for all its alleged unorthodoxy, after all only followed the ordinary Catholic interpretation of the words, " My kingdom is not of this world."

In our country especially there is a disposition to flatter ourselves that we have solved the whole problem quite simply by the widely

adopted Free Church opinion that Church and State should be entirely separated. As a matter of fact, this separation has not been effected, and would be no real solution. It is always a compromise ; it overlooks the fact that the same person is often both a subject of the Church and of the State, and on issue may have to choose between the two. Moreover, this theory, which is merely a working compromise, and not a logical theory at all, leaves the Church almost entirely ineffective in its influence upon the practical affairs of the world, which are largely surrendered to trust in force.

The pernicious effect of this trust in force can be seen in various directions. First of all, we must note the amazing degradation of military warfare into every kind of cruelty, bestiality, trickery, and spying, to which all nations are now committed. It is not only the cruelty and bestiality of war itself, but the lying that all war entails that is its most degrading thing ; far worse than killing men's bodies is the killing of their souls, and lying does that. The moment you prepare yourself for the possible attack of another country, you must spy out what they are doing, and tell lies about what you are doing. Secondly, there must be noted the dehumanising of the penal system into irredemptive and soulless repression which

is bound to take place under a trust in force. If there is no power by which men can be converted, then resource must be had to coercion. All this may be administered under humanitarian motives and sanitary and scientific conditions, and yet be wholly hopeless and really cruel. And it is not only the persons who are imprisoned or placed under restrictions who are dehumanised, but the officials employed to administer the system, and ultimately the society that sanctions it. A third tendency to be noted is the demoralisation of the democratic machine by flattery and deception; for when higher sanctions are no longer sought or believed in, the only means of governing people, for their good, by their consent, is by concealing from them the aims as well as the methods of government. As a politician not long ago declared: "You have to have a bit of the devil in you to govern other people." This is Machiavellianism, but it would be difficult to maintain that any other method was possible in a purely secular democracy. As a complete theory of government, pure democracy at its worst is liable to the corruption and deception of the people; at its best, to the soullessness of bureaucracy and the depersonalisation of its leaders, who become mere registers of mass opinion. This need not be if leaders sought election from the people on the ground

of the principles they themselves held, and with a sense of commission from God ; but that is only possible when democracy is supplemented by personal religious faith.

Slowly, however, a great revolt is being prepared in the minds of men, first, against Empires, by the rising to racial consciousness of subject peoples ; and, secondly, against the Absolute State, by minorities who appeal to the sovereignty of conscience. There is no doubt that this revolt has been fostered by Christian ideas, rightly or wrongly interpreted. We need not at this period settle the right or wrong of this revolt ; it is a fact, and it constitutes a menace to the State. The modern State, with its inevitable appeal to force, and the modern Empire, with its predominantly economic motive, are in an unstable condition, and their break-up is threatened not from without, against which they are always preparing, but from within, against which there is no defence. Yet there is no subject to which thinking men, and even statesmen and politicians, give less consideration than to the ultimate sanction of government ; unless it be the authority for education, which is one of the other great subjects where, for want of consideration, we flounder without any sense of direction, or agreement of principle.

Empires are to-day, and to every one's astonishment, cracking under the resurgence of

nationalism, which it was thought man had finally outgrown ; while, on the other hand, in order to avoid the peril of war, nations are now being compelled to feel their way to something like a super-State, for instance, in the League of Nations idea. The issue at stake in both is State sovereignty. Even in advanced socialist theory the movement is away from democracy, towards either a coercive autocracy, or free co-operation. These counter-ideals seem likely to urge the people from one extreme to another, until in blind experiment all stable government is rendered impossible, political action comes to be discredited as valueless, and the whole social order breaks down. Yet these obscure, and apparently blind movements are pointing to the necessity for a new idea of government and a new type of empire.

The Catholic conception might seem able to fill this place, but at present it is hindered by the corruptions and perversions of its own past, which have formed false associations in people's minds and prejudice any further consideration. It is one of the devil's best devices to get hold of the finest ideals and so corrupt and confuse them that they only arouse suspicion and hatred. This has happened with Catholicism and recently with Communism ; but it is a device of which we need not be ignorant. Unfortunately, however, the

modern Catholic seems unable to discern how everything in the modern world is crying out for an empire which Christ alone can bring, and he fails to understand how Catholicism ought to provide some different solution from the essentially Protestant solution of the division of spheres into secular and religious; which means, in the end, the inapplicability of religion to practical affairs, denying to Christ any real empire and obscuring what, after all, is the one hope of the world, namely, the acknowledgment of what the Disruption Presbyterians, though with a different application, called "The Crown Rights of the Redeemer," and the recognition that Christ alone is capable of governing mankind.

If the world is going to find the open path of true progress, men must go back and take up again the unfulfilled ideals of the past. The fundamental Biblical outlook has been ignored in the interpretation of isolated texts of Scripture. The original theocratic ideal should never be forgotten. God is, after all, the only King, because He is the only ruler who has real power, and therefore He is the only sure defence. The administration of law and the preservation of peace can only come through the acknowledged reign of God. In His Messianic claims Christ really resumes

the theocratic ideal. It can easily be shown from His own teaching that Jesus did not proclaim a merely inward, simply spiritual, and purely heavenly kingdom. The kingdom is all that, but something besides, for it will have outward effects, which may be summarised as follows: Our Lord taught that Mammon, that is, hoarded treasure, was not the best way to secure freedom from anxiety. He evidently did not believe in enforced legal decisions; taxation He bound up with the recognition of Cæsar. The famous saying, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," does not provide Cæsar with an everlasting sanction, but only so long as men use his methods, when, of course, they must pay for them. The abandonment of Mammon worship and Cæsarism also means giving up the protection of the sword. These important and disputed subjects have had to be dealt with summarily, and it may all seem to many too simple and idealistic. But all Christ's teaching must sound like that to worldly convention and prudence. To keep to our immediate subject, however, it needs to be pointed out that Christ's reference to His Kingdom being not of this world, does not deny that it is meant to have an earthly embodiment, which the Lord's Prayer makes sufficiently clear; but that it does not rest upon the ordinary secular basis,

or adopt the methods of worldly government. The Book of the Revelation, moreover, openly assumes that the Kingdom of Christ is to supersede the kingdoms of this world; and this only fulfils the prediction of the Book of Daniel, namely, the passing of the kingdoms of the beasts and the coming of the Kingdom of the Son of Man. Pilate probably understood Christ's meaning better than our modern expositors; he knew when Christ stood before him that there was really something to fear from Him; not that Christ would overturn Cæsar's kingdom by snatching at his sword, but by one day abolishing Cæsar's kingdom and his sword altogether.

This also seems the unrealised ideal behind Mediæval Catholicism. The Church believed it had succeeded to the Messiah's claims; for the Church had become the extension of the Incarnation, and thus fell heir to Christ's Kingdom. This is why the moment the word "Church" comes into the New Testament the word "Kingdom" goes out. The Church must, therefore, undertake Messianic functions; namely, the prescribing of the law and the preservation of peace; but neither of them by force. For by a process of elimination we seem compelled to consider a hitherto untried relation between Church and State. Let us notice those methods that have been

tried and have failed. The State has tried to govern the Church against its will and has always failed. It has tried to govern the Church with its will, as in the Erastian method ; with no other result than the shameful humiliation of the Church. Again, the Church has tried to govern the State ; but only by becoming a State itself and using State methods, as under the Mediæval Papacy. The proposal longest tried has been that the State and the Church should be regarded as twin powers, both derived immediately from God ; as in Dante's conception outlined in his *De Monarchia*. Whether Dante's ideal was right for his own generation or not, its modern version inevitably comes very near to neither Church nor State being regarded as derived from God ; for while the modern State fails to find any real place for religion, the modernist conception of the Church tends to regard it as a purely human convenience ; with the result that both are now threatening to collapse.

The only alternative left to consider, and it is one that has never been tried, is that the Church should supersede the State altogether. This seems to be in line with the Hebrew theocracy and Messianic ideals ; while it takes up the true ideal in the old claim of the Church to temporal power, which must, of course, be separated from its mediæval perversions ; though

it means something more than the modest dimensions of the modern demand, which is simply that the Vatican should have a strip of neutral territory, preferably open to the sea, so that in time of war the Roman Church could keep up its world connections ; a claim which is not only entirely reasonable but which serves to remind the world of the function of the Church, and would provide a striking protest against the madness of war. This last untried alternative means that the State would disappear, its functions being taken over by the Church ; but, it must be carefully understood, not by the Church becoming a State with an earthly territory, a worldly policy, and the employment of force ; but that the State should give way to the purely spiritual constitution of the Church, which is alone really capable of governing mankind.

But is not this proposal too hopelessly ideal ? Even if it were accepted as the only true solution, should we not be compelled to wait for its establishment by purely supernatural action ? Here the Plymouth Brethren and the Roman Catholic Church, who are often in unexpected agreement, would admit that this was the Divine programme, but that it must be postponed until the coming of Christ. But others might consider that it would involve something almost equally super-

natural to expect the Church, especially in its now broken and enfeebled condition, to take up the task which it laid down in the Middle Ages; a task which was as much laid down as it was taken away, because it proved impossible; namely, to manage and provide for the whole life of the people. Or, to take a more modern conception, is it even possible to believe that the Church will ever be able to teach the people individual loyalty and free combination, so that they will be able to dispense with every kind of coercive government; the Church existing merely to inspire by its worship and teaching, to give decisions on questions of moral right, but everything else being carried on by co-operative but non-coercive enterprise among the people?

But this ideal should not be surrendered beforehand as impossible. Our immediate concern is whether this ideal is Christian, whether history confirms it as the only line of progress left open, and whether we can do anything to prepare for its realisation. Our present *impasse* is due, on the one hand, to the refusal to consider and work towards ultimate ideals, confining ourselves solely to the immediately practical; and, on the other, to the adoption of ultimate ideals, but attempting to realise them apart from religious inspiration, and to enforce them upon people

who do not believe in them. These are not academic and remote concerns; they are already sharpening into a contest between political idealists who would give no public recognition to religion because they cannot see any need for it, or think it would be of no use to them, or even regard it as a hindrance and denial; and those, it is to be feared a much larger number, who are opposed to all political idealism because they have no religion at all, or only a religion which is not meant to be applied to life, or a religion which regards the present condition of earthly injustice as the preparation for heavenly compensation later on, and therefore not to be interfered with. Thus, it should be noticed, the forces supposed to be in political opposition are really leagued together to prevent the establishment of the Kingdom of Christ; and the only practical alternative they are voting for is the perpetuation of evil and injustice, and a miserable end for mankind; whether reached by decline and hopelessness, or by revolution and violence, it will be precisely the same end, and it is an alternative that is now actually threatening humanity.

For it must be remembered that, according to the New Testament, the ideal is possible, here in this world; but it is by no means inevitable. When our Lord teaches us to pray

that God's Kingdom should come, and His will be done on earth as it is in heaven, that exhortation involves two important principles: first, that the Kingdom of God *can* come on earth, for it is useless to pray for the impossible; and, secondly, that the coming of the Kingdom on earth is not inevitable, for there is no need to pray for the inevitable. For the notion of an enforced millennium under the personal reign of Christ, hoped for by some sects, has rightly been rejected by Catholic thought. God will never coerce the world with goodness, as those crude millennial hopes would entail. He may prevent men from erecting evil into a universal kingdom; but that probably involves ending this world and confining the rebellious against God and humanity in hell. But we can enforce upon our generation the lessons taught by the obvious results of rejecting Christ's Kingdom. For no longer is there any rational hope in the alternative idea of inevitable secular progress; progress is not desired by the majority, and secular perfection would content no one.

These conclusions do not, however, mean that we are committed to a religious resistance to the modern State and the impracticable demand for its immediate abolition. It is a question of ultimate aims; though, of course, these will determine our general direction,

and therefore the choice of policy. The Christian policy will naturally be different both from the extreme conservative motive, which is really the repression of evil, and the extreme communistic motive, which is really compulsion to good.

There is a mediating position open in the recognition of the State as a divine but temporary ordinance. Without some admission of St. Paul's teaching on the divine ordinance of government, no government can hope to continue even under modern democratic conditions. But, as we have seen, the admission of a divine ordinance does not involve a claim to divine right whatever a government may be. Government can plead a divine sanction only so long as it serves God's purpose. Moreover, it is a divine ordinance, and therefore only of a temporary character, and not meant to be permanent. For existing governments this necessity for a divine sanction will not be discharged by a merely conventional recognition of religion; religion must be openly confessed and actually adopted as the ideal of government. Any type of government that would continue in the future must claim that it governs only under the supremacy of Christ and with a desire to fulfil His will. It must not only seek to incorporate His teaching in the proposals it makes, it must not

only look to the Church to stand beside it and inspire, control, and compensate the people's life by its faith, its worship, and its immortal hope ; governments must themselves look forward to the day when they will be superseded, when all the people shall have learned self-government. The ideal to be pursued, therefore, is less and less earthly government in the coercive sense, with more and more of the direct government of Christ, which would take away the need for coercion ; that is to say, the State, as such, must grow less, and the Kingdom of Christ more and more. It is actually in such a direction that the most advanced social doctrine is now looking, away from the necessarily absolute, bureaucratic, and coercive State, and towards free co-operation ; an ever larger measure of registered agreement under which we are all willing to live, an ever-growing number of voluntary combinations under which men will delight to work ; but with ever less need for enforcement and coercion.

Those advanced ideals cut through all our modern political controversies, call off " die-hard " conservatism and State Socialism from their struggle to possess the moribund body and clogged machine of industrialism, but all the more call for the universal and intense inspiration of religion, and the exaltation of

the Church as the supreme and universal power in human life. This supremacy of the Church involves, however, that the Church is able to secure, and is gladly yielded loyalty to her decisions, for they will have neither legal nor coercive power. The Church's blessing upon all true forms of combination, personal, social, or economic, which will be cemented by solemn acts of worship, will probably be all that is necessary for her to attempt in the way of direct management of the people's lives; for they will be able to manage their own, because of their direct government by the Spirit of Christ. This seems to come into line with the historical tendency which indicates that the Church is best when inspirational rather than institutional. Such a Church would effect what mere force and legality would never accomplish. It would mean, of course, that the Catholic Church would be recognised as the only form of State or super-State; loyalty to which would positively prevent the people from ever warring upon their fellow-Christians, in any form, economic or military. Christ would be recognised as the only King, the only One possessing power, real power, which is the authority of right. All attempts on the part of world governments to get possession of power only means that they take an instrument into their hands

which in the end is bound to be turned against themselves; if they would serve humanity any longer, they must abandon might for right, and prepare to hand over their crowns and sceptres to Him who alone is worthy.

Thus "the powers that be," in the old sense, will have served their purpose and prepared the way for Him who alone is able to rule, not by force or fear, but by love and loyalty, His head crowned with many crowns, His orb our world surmounted by a cross, His sceptre acknowledged by all mankind.

Chapter VI — *Christianity and Racial Brotherhood*

We have already considered how the very multitude of mankind presents a challenge to the Christian religion whether it can offer anything that will comprehend and satisfy so vast and varied a need. And even if we admit that Christ, and only Christ, because He is God incarnate in man, can meet this need, then certain relationships, groupings, and organisations of mankind seem to compete with Christ for human loyalty, and threaten to obscure His claim.

For instance, the private relationship of human love frequently competes with and confuses the soul's dependence upon God. The intense attraction which can be generated between persons, ranging from the lowest form of physical attraction between the sexes to the highest form of soul affinity, may find itself crossed by ecclesiastical regulation, religious instinct, or divine call; and it is no small difficulty to show that Christ's demand that He must be loved first of all is no arbitrary command, and is due to no despising of human

love, but is essential to the highest interests of humanity, is the necessary regulator of all human love and affection, and the only full and final satisfaction of the hunger of man's heart for companionship, friendship, and love.

But in addition, we have seen that human efforts after social organisation in communities, states, and empires equally compete with Christ's ecclesiastical, royal, and imperial claims. The State may virtually deify itself, and thus provoke a conflict, such as in the attempt to substitute the worship of the Emperor for the worship of Christ, which eventually brought the Roman Empire to the ground. Or the State may feel compelled to adopt a religious neutrality, which is the modern way out of the difficulty, but which we have seen reason to believe is not any likelier to find a solution, because then the State finds itself ultimately without any other authority than that of force, under which men will not for ever be content to be ruled; and so, although the reason for the truth remains unknown both to governors and governed, the modern State may find its authority questioned, flouted, resisted, one attempt after another made to right matters, but on no sort of principle or foresight, until the State itself perishes through contempt, is worn out by constant friction, or is dissolved in anarchy of one kind or another. The ex-

pansion, military defence, and economic exigencies of an Empire may be challenged and crossed by the humanitarian sanctions of the Christian religion, its inspiration towards freedom, its hatred of war, and the spiritual value which it puts upon the individual soul, however lowly and insignificant.

Now this individual attraction of one soul for another on the one hand, and this social organisation on the other, tend to combine and to constitute a new resistance to religious idealism in the complex phenomenon known as Race. For racial consciousness, with its all too common products of antipathy and antagonism, depends ultimately upon a mass attraction, almost as subtle, obscure, and strong as sexual attraction ; and, in turn, this is fostered and intensified by national and imperial organisation.

Again, racial consciousness is often dependent upon and expresses itself in religion ; and thus, at many points, Race presents a stubborn problem to the Christian religion, not only resisting its universal propagation, but denying its doctrine of the brotherhood of man.

Nevertheless, to anthropological science race consciousness presents something of an enigma ; for there is no ascertained, agreed scientific basis for most racial distinctions. There are definite racial features distinguishable, but they

are slight, superficial, and indeterminate. It does not matter whether you take the pigmentation of the skin, the shape of skull, or the type of hair: none of these things any more corresponds to racial divisions than whether a man has blue eyes, brown, or black; and, even if we could be certain that there were at one time originally pure, diversified stocks, there has been such immigration and intermingling all through history, that these have either disappeared or are fast disappearing. Some examples of this scientific but often overlooked fact may be given. The Indian is Aryan, as his features show, and yet it is the colour of the Hindu that makes the strongly felt difference in the race consciousness. On the other hand, the modern white man shows many varieties of head; racial types, as far as the shape of the head is concerned, could almost all be paralleled in any considerable gathering of Englishmen, while where we have a much mingled people, as in America, they tend to approximate to a homogeneous type. It is in conditions of race mingling, such as we get in America, which tend to create, not a new race, but a strong racial consciousness; for race feeling does not follow scientific race distinctions. Some of the bitterest animosities are developed among people presumably of the same race; for instance, between North and

South America in the Civil War. It is difficult to prevent race feeling growing up between Britishers and Americans, so closely akin; it has to be continually fought down, and one is always fearing lest it should prove too strong and create trouble. The appeal to racial antagonism between ourselves and the Germans was frequent during the late War, and some curious anthropological arguments were used in its support despite the obviously similar racial characteristics. On the other hand, countries like Switzerland and Belgium develop a strong national consciousness despite the racial divisions they embrace, even when these distinctions are hardened and perpetuated by the difference of language. There are in Switzerland three markedly different races of people speaking three languages — German, French, and Italian; yet there is a strong national consciousness which would resist the disintegration of Switzerland if it were attacked.

Racial consciousness has not an objective basis even in colour; although it is over that point that race feeling undoubtedly becomes most acute; but it is almost certain that this colour feeling is not truly instinctive. For instance, children do not feel it: a child may be frightened by a black man's face, but only because his appearance is unusual; when the child has got over the fright, the feeling passes,

for, as we know, children will readily take to black nurses. And although race feeling will erect barriers in relation to marriage, on which subject people will become horrified, it has to be confessed with shame that colour is no barrier to extra-marital intercourse ; race feeling is overcome in that respect wherever two colours meet, as the large half-caste populations in all such places sufficiently testifies. Although the colour ban is strong among British and Americans, it is said to be almost absent in Frenchmen. It cannot be strong in New Zealand, for in the army supplied by that country during the war, whites and Maoris were found in the same company, just as among the French, with their regiments of Frenchmen, the Moroccans. Even in America, where the colour distinction is felt so keenly, the aversion is becoming more marked in connection with the Chinese than with the negroes, though this would not be the case if colour feeling was the fundamental fact it is sometimes alleged to be.

Neither is there sufficient proof that colour indicates inferiority in mental or moral capacity. Most careful statistical research shows that whatever difference in innate capacity can be detected under educational tests, for instance, between black and white people, it is so slightly different that it is quite minute, and it can be safely presumed that what difference there is

can be ascribed to the longer training and hereditary influences among white people. The alleged inferiority of half-caste populations is probably due to the stigma of illegitimacy and to the social ostracism that they have to endure from both sides ; they belong to neither race, and the feeling of being socially outcast must have a demoralising effect on the half-caste peoples. Where the half-caste population is more numerous than the pure breeds this effect is diminished ; for instance, it can be questioned whether the half-caste populations of South America are not as good as, if not better than, the pure Spaniard.

A very interesting example of racial consciousness is to be found in the widespread antipathy to the Jewish race, where there is little distinction of feature and practically none of colour ; yet the dislike of the Jewish race seems to be universal. It apparently goes far back into history, is confessed by educated and kindly disposed people, and can be worked up into the prejudice and hatred known as anti-Semitism. It has probably nothing whatever to do with race, but is almost certainly due to the historic religious pride and exclusiveness of the Jews, to the social degradation which has been their lot for centuries, and to the fact that they are particularly successful in financial pursuits ; the feelings easily aroused

against the poor, those we have wronged, or those who have become rich, are combined in the case of the Jews. Certainly it cannot be argued that this revulsion against the Jewish race is due to any mental or moral inferiority on their part; for they have always, despite degrading circumstances and denial of opportunity, manifested outstanding intellectual power, and that in almost every branch of learning, thought, and culture. In fact, it is probably their powers of intellectual assimilation that help to make them so disliked: we rarely like our intellectual superiors. We Christians at any rate have to admit that the Jews have provided the world with moral leadership; and to quote the most astonishing fact of all in this connection, it was this widely disliked race which produced the most widely loved human personality, Jesus Christ.

But, although there may be no objective basis for racial distinctions, racial consciousness is a subjective and psychological fact of indisputable reality and of irrepressible force. Racial feeling is among the most easily worked up and the most stubborn of all human emotions. There is hardly any one who has not some racial prejudice in him to which you can appeal, and it is racial revulsion which must be roused if people are to be worked up to war. Think of the cumbrous efforts, made

during the late War, to prove that the Germans were of a different stock from ourselves. One lamentable effort made by a distinguished writer sought to include us among the Latin races, in order to find us any pigeon-hole other than alongside the Teuton, and then, with a perversity astonishing in a professed Catholic, urged that Christianity is natural to the Latin race, and to them only. Such is the apparent basis of Mr. Hilaire Belloc's otherwise important, but unfortunately ruined appeal, in *Europe and the Faith*.

Do we not all confess as English our consciousness of racial difference, superiority, and even supremacy? And yet what a mongrel stock we are! And, by the bye, should it be "English" or "British"?—which question indeed shows how futile is the appeal to Race. Probably many Englishmen would have to confess to feeling more antagonised by the Scotch and more perplexed by the Welsh, than by more widely separated racial types, and any violent patriotic display on the part of a Britisher raises the suspicion that he is of somewhat recent naturalisation. It is in the most mongrel race, which only modern conditions could produce, that of the United States, that racial consciousness is rising as almost nowhere else.

Racial consciousness is, however, a psycho-

logical fact, beyond being changed either by argument or ridicule, and it can probably be analysed down to a community of feeling, resting upon some period of cultural homogeneity, and creating a strong preference for its own type; though, as a rule, this racial consciousness is latent until it is threatened or insulted. It naturally becomes intense where races are in close contact, yet remain, or desire to remain, unmixed; as, for instance, between the negroes and whites of the United States and South Africa; between the white and the coloured in India; and between the white and the yellow in Australia. These conditions create almost insane revulsions, give rise to various legal restrictions, and erect all kinds of social barriers; political and social equality is resisted, and sometimes even spiritual equality bluntly denied.

This attitude on the part of the people who consider themselves the superior race naturally rouses intense antagonism amongst those who are considered inferior, and promises one day to become, unless something can prevent its natural development, more than an academic problem—a world-wide catastrophe; and yet the people close up to the problem often declare that those have no right to pronounce upon it who are not near to it, as if it were no concern of theirs. This differing attitude, depending

upon proximity and mass suggestion, brings us to the core of the psychological problem which racial consciousness creates. For instance, in our home universities we may meet with Indians on terms of perfect social equality, but in India it would be very difficult to do that. You can take a negro into any hotel in London, but that could not be done in New York. And most of us would soon respond to the differing psychological feeling generated under these different conditions. But people in actual contact with the problem declare that it is not a psychological problem, but the quite practical possibility of revolution, of rape, or of political domination; from which they demand protection by armed force, social differentiation, and political subordination. This is claimed to be the realistic view of those who know, in contradistinction to the sentimental view of people who only theorise at a safe distance. But whatever this view may claim to be, it is not realistic; because it is as certain as any fact can be, that however much we might wish it, and however desirable it might be for the welfare of mankind as a whole, the dominance of the white over the coloured races cannot be maintained for ever by such methods: it will eventually prove an impossible task, however determined and drastic the methods proposed. The mere contact of two such races is bound to

arouse the ambition of the lower ; some kind of education must be given or will be provided merely by contact, and if domination is too long persisted in, it will provoke in the end a vengeful retaliation against which the white races could not efficiently arm themselves even if they spent their strength in nothing else. The vast masses of India are kept under British rule by a population no bigger than that of Belgium ; that can only continue as long as the masses of India do not mind our alien rule ; it will not go on for ever. That different methods of meeting the difficulty are not considered is simply because people only trouble about what is going to happen in their time ; they think of no generation beyond their own children ; and therefore it is always too late some day.

The actual alternatives are these : to keep the coloured peoples in slavery, which can no longer be done, because the white races themselves will not consent to it ; to exterminate them, which again neither our conscience nor our courage will permit ; to increase the white population in comparison with all others until we attain a position of numerical superiority. This last proposal is confronted by the tiresome fact that if the adoption of birth restriction becomes popular, the white races will dwindle and the coloured races will multiply, for they

will not learn or practise birth restriction until long after the white races.

Beyond this colour clash is the wider antagonism which is supposed to exist between East and West; or, strictly speaking, Europe and America against Asia and Africa. This adds to the fear of "the rising tide of colour," the old fear of "the Yellow Peril"; and there can be added again to this the orientation of Russia; for if Russia continues to remain outcast from European civilisation she will look towards the East; and already a party in China is inclined to wonder if the Bolshevist method may not solve her internal chaos and provide the best defence against Western aggression. If China goes Bolshevist it will probably provide an even more terrifying example of ferocity than Russia.

Now, despite the common assumption, the cause of this antagonism between East and West is not really racial, as the derivation of all Western religions from the East sufficiently disproves. It is due to those psychological prejudices and preferences which we have discovered in other antagonisms, to which there have been added even stronger political and economic intensifications, and these have roused the East to resentment at what it believes to be the exploitation of the West. Moreover, the Eastern nations are feeding their resentment

by the claim that they are really superior to us in culture, civilisation, and religion, and they are determined to resist Westernisation, whether industrial or religious ; so that here our problem is doubled, for the race feeling is not simply on one side, but is replied to by summoning race feeling on the other side, and thus an atmosphere of suspicion, hatred, and contempt is created, in which all mutual understanding is rendered impossible.

The growing race consciousness of the East erects a formidable barrier to the propagation of Christianity, which promised to find a solution, and must still be the only hope, if it is not, and perhaps only by a few years, too late. The position in the East presents the picture of a neck and neck race between its Christianisation and the rise of a hostile racial antagonism to everything Western ; for the East is beginning to identify Christianity with a Western paganised civilisation, and therefore with industrialism, militarism, and vandalism. It is impossible to exaggerate this problem, for it is preparing for a world crisis of unparalleled magnitude.

Can Christ lift us above this antagonism, and enable us to discern and demand the application of Christian principle to the Race problem ? We can assuredly claim that God desires racial distinctions to continue. These

distinctions, as we saw, are based upon small differences in physique and mentality, but these become widened, get emphasised, and create deep feeling through community and culture. Now, these distinctions, in the light of Christianity, are worth preserving because of the contribution that they may possibly make. Humanity produces its highest cultural results only in small homogeneous groups. This is evidenced from the past in the story of Israel, the story of Greece, and, as far as art is concerned, the story of Italy. Great undiversified groups are levelling and dulling, and the stagnation of China and India has been traced to their massive undiversified grouping. Apparently humanity cannot be everything at once ; we must specialise. History shows that racial grouping is valuable for the evolution of definite religion. The Christian religion itself was developed under the most exclusive racial consciousness, and Christianity faced and fought its first crisis not over racial abolition, but over racial contribution and the transcendence of enmity. According to the Book of the Revelation the redeemed are to be gathered out of every nation, and people, and kindred, and tongue, and are thus to enrich the interpretation of Christ and to make more glorious the harmony of Heaven. Christianity therefore would preserve the

races, gathering their distinctive contributions into the rich and varied unity of the Catholic Church; and, from this point of view, the disappearance of a race would have to be regarded as a serious loss to humanity, and especially to that width and fulness that religion must compass if it is going to give man here on earth a worthy conception of the grace and glory of God, and even fulfil his beatitude in heaven.

It is probably, therefore, only Christianity that can sanction and secure the survival of racial distinctions. Some peoples have already been completely wiped out by contact with civilisation, and others are in process of disappearance; and if to-day we are beginning to resent the slaughter that is getting rid of some of our most beautiful birds and some of the most interesting mammals, because we know that no amount of evolution will be able to produce them again, surely mankind might begin to resent the disappearance of some of its own diversified types. Contrary to the usual calculations, one distinguished authority on population believes that the white race is in no danger of being eliminated, but that despite all that may happen it will increase out of proportion to all the others, and that in a hundred years from now the white race will equal all the other races put together;

and that probably means that the other races will not survive for more than a thousand years after that. Now, this would be a catastrophe, not only because it would decrease the present diversity of external appearances, but because it would remove the corrective of mental differences. The black mind may be a simpler kind than that of the West, and the Eastern mind may appear unfathomable to the West; but we need them to balance ours, which is becoming both complicated and superficial. It is not even certain that the Western races will continue to produce great thinkers. Our knowledge is too vast for our minds to synthesise; fundamental thinking is postponed by immediate practical problems; the ultimate aim of life goes unconsidered, and seems a useless concern even to learned and thoughtful people in our modern conditions; and in consequence religion becomes personally unnecessary, and our science and politics are so short-sighted that they may destroy us before we realise we are in danger. In the race between the West and the East the old fable of the hare and the tortoise may be illustrated once more.

It may be that the differences in race, though minute, do represent a certain degree of inequality. It may possibly be that the white races may have a certain genius for govern-

ment, but it is quite obvious that if other races are to continue to be governed by us it can be only by their consent. Governing capacity, moreover, does not necessarily involve high spiritual capacity: persons of high spiritual concern are generally too much occupied with governing themselves; which, after all, provides an example of self-government which others can follow, and thus best solves the problem of government; otherwise those who govern develop dull, ferocious minds, and the governed lose initiative and interest. The true Christian attitude towards the racial problem does not mean that we should deny the existence of inequalities, neither does it mean that intermarriage and intermigration, at least on a wide scale, are necessarily wise; for intermarriage would destroy the very differences we want to preserve, and the large flooding of any lands with alien peoples might have the same effect. It is noticeable that when St. Paul made his great proclamation at Athens that God had made all men of one blood, he went on to declare that He had set them within the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek after God; as if the nations could best seek after God in the places to which they belong. But the matter of intermarriage and intermigration must be settled by agreement. It may be best for

the Japanese *not* to go to America ; but under the " Gentlemen's Agreement " it is Japan that has to determine how many of her people should emigrate to the United States. It is said that this plan is not working perfectly, but it is early yet to decide that it is a failure, and, at least, it is a great bid for idealism.

If there are some races morally so much lower than others that this constitutes a danger to the higher races, this must be overcome not by elimination or repression, but by conversion. And if there is no known converting agency, then the problem is insoluble ; for moral coercion always demoralises the coercers and does nothing to moralise the coerced. There can be no question of spiritual equality in the estimate of God, or from the price Christ has paid for every soul. But Catholic theology does not commit us to the doctrine that we shall ultimately all be spiritually equal. It declares that the redeemed shall all be perfectly happy, each according to his capacity, but that those of higher capacity can increase the happiness of those who have less. Therefore if there is spiritual inequality, it is in order that the higher may serve the lower. The saint always lives entirely for the glory of God and for his fellows, and never for himself. Whether that points the way to the solution of racial in-

equalities, and whether that application can be made a practical reality, depends largely upon Christ's followers. Some critics of Christianity are already assured that failure on this issue is a foregone conclusion. It is very common to meet the assumption that Christianity has failed; but the truth is, Christianity has never had a chance. The identification of Western civilisation with Christianity, especially the condemnation of Christianity for industrialism and militarism, however easy it may be to quote evidence for their interdependence, is an obvious injustice. Christianity has for long been excluded from the economic and political spheres, and at present it is fighting a desperate battle to maintain a foothold in the West. There is an awakening in the Church to the necessity for applying Christian principles to these very problems, but this is only true of a minority, and the motives and aims are very confused. The Church no longer speaks with a united voice, and for this condition of things the world is not in the position to blame the Church, still less Christianity, and Christ not at all. None of the churches and none of the sectarian interpretations of Christianity has yet attained to the level of Christ's teaching; but perhaps this is hardly to be wondered at seeing what His teaching is,

and who we are, to whose fidelity it is entrusted.

Again, the influence of Christian missions is differently estimated. It is debatable whether the number of adherents in non-Christian lands is now sufficient to influence the problem. To add to this uncertainty, there is the fear that Christian missions tend to produce the Western conditions over again; which means that they will only destroy the East if they succeed, or will only embitter the resistance of the East if they fail. But this is taking a very pessimistic view of Christian missions, which for the purposes of our outlook we have preferred to estimate at the lowest. Even if it were true that Christianity itself had failed, or that Christian missions cannot affect our problem, we may be certain that Christ does not depend wholly upon either of them. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Christianity is slowly taking hold of the Eastern world, and in some countries, notably China, is approaching the position where it is bound to be a deciding influence. The Eastern world, considered widely, and excepting Mahommedanism, seems to be giving up resistance to Christianity, and is now inclined to attempt an adaptation of Christianity, as the best defence against what it regards as a purely Westernised interpretation of Chris-

tianity, which it considers both corrupt and hypocritical. Native representatives of the Protestant Churches in China have recently drawn up a declaration of Christianity, no doubt motived by the demand for a Chinafied Christianity. Strangely enough, it reads like an exceedingly modern and Western version of Christianity, and if one had not known its origin, one might have guessed that it was drawn up in England, maybe by the Student Christian Movement, a few years ago. There are also signs of a mass movement towards Christianity in India, and this has been strengthened, strangely enough, through the national movement, and is therefore tinged with political motives. But these movements may bring their own corrective; we may rejoice "that whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is preached"; and we may believe that the Spirit of God will through all inspire and lead men into the truth. The situation is critical and confused, but it is by no means hopeless.

It may come to pass, therefore, that the East *will* defeat the West, but only in such a way as to make for the triumph of Christianity; for it is not beyond possibility that the East may become more Christian than the West has ever been. Moreover, if we have any faith in Christ, we must believe that He is

greater than Christendom, or His disciples, or His Church. He works upon men by His Spirit everywhere, of course more slowly than if He could work through faithful disciples and a united and responsive Church: with them or without them, He works nevertheless.

And even if the worst should happen, our ultimate hope is not in human movements, or in this world at all, but in Christ and the world to come. The Judge is always at the gates. He stands there ready to save or to judge, and if His world should need it, and when it needs it, He will come again, and if necessary bring human history to a close, and transfer His kingdom to a sphere where it can never fail.

Chapter VII — *The Catholic Church and World Peace*

THE problem of world peace has become one which is likely to exercise the minds of men for some time to come and, indeed, until some reasonable guarantee against war has been found. That peace is no longer the concern of the few who for one reason or another dislike war, is perhaps one of the beneficent results, perhaps the only beneficent result, of the Great War. That war has at last awakened mankind to the awful possibilities now inherent in the menace of international strife. War can involve practically the total resources of civilisation; either by almost universal male conscription, the new methods of aerial attack, or the recourse to naval blockade, entire populations may now be endangered, and combatants and non-combatants will be equally imperilled; it may shatter the social order, destroy civilisation, and decimate humanity. It is possible that the dangers of another war may be exaggerated. The damage done by the Great War is, after all, less than might have been expected, in the

number slain and wounded, in the area of devastation, and in its social and economic results. Humanity seems to possess extraordinary recuperative powers. On the other hand, it may be impossible to exaggerate the effects of another great war, for that may be beyond all imagination. It is indisputable that wars have been increasing, in the cost of blood and treasure, in the nations involved, in the extent of devastation, and in deadliness with each successive war, and, since modern scientific invention has been employed, in something very like geometrical progression ; so that we may reasonably expect that as the Great War surpassed the Napoleonic War, so the next war may surpass the Great War. The last war was the greatest, simply because it was the last ; the next may be greater still. Moreover, the damage done to human morality is an even more serious concern than the physical suffering and the material destruction ; it has hindered spiritual progress, discredited idealism, and confused, obscured, and almost destroyed Christianity.

There was nothing really fortuitous and unrepeatable in the circumstances of the Great War, even if the conventional view of its cause and origin is adopted ; and it is getting more and more difficult to maintain the conventional view as time goes by. The swift rise and

militarisation of the German Empire is, under modern conditions of development and change, not an inexplicable thing, even if it were traceable to some terrible wickedness, madness, or ambition overtaking a single race. This is always possible with human nature, especially when quickened by the workings of modern social psychology, a method whose processes we are only just beginning to adopt, in modern education and mass suggestion, which can mould men's opinions far more quickly than ever before; especially under the dominant philosophy of the secular State, which in all modern political thinking tends to make the State the supreme and all-sufficient reality in this world, and force its only strength and sanction, the Church and religion for all practical purposes having been displaced and ceased to count.

Economic competition, imperial ideals, racial antipathy, are always present to foster and foment an outbreak, and they may be discerned as already preparing for a further explosion. A war which will much more than the last deserve the description of "a World War" may be all too possible within a hundred years from now, if the present tendencies of nationalism, class consciousness, or colour clash are allowed to develop. It is all too easy to imagine a world war occasioned by the rise of the rest

of the world in resistance against the dominance of the white races. These conditions are already threatening, and unless there is a great change in human outlook, a struggle which must end all human hopes is inevitable. Moreover, the working out of vengeance which every war nurses up for the next, the inevitable wages of the sins of wholesale pride, hate, lying, and murder must at length drown mankind in its own blood; and the misery and dread of what must be predicted are only tempered by the consolation that in the judgment of some, and they more pitying than cynical, the collapse of civilisation and the wiping out of humanity are not so dreadful as the alternative of their continuance on our present basis.

No wonder that at last men are getting concerned; and yet what, after all, are the secular hopes of putting an end to war? We have to face the fatalistic conviction of so many that war is inevitable. It does not matter whether there is such a thing as Fate; if men believe in Fate, what is believed to be fated is that which, apart from divine intervention, is likely to come to pass. Men say there always have been wars, and there always will be wars. War is rooted in the constitution of human nature and in the conditions of earthly existence, as these play the one upon the other. And if it is pointed out in answer to these fatalists that

such an ancient institution as slavery, for instance, has been abolished, they can answer that some regard the modern wage system as only slavery in another form ; it has not been abolished, it has only been transformed. In the same way, while we are concentrating upon preventing international warfare, men are concentrating upon civil revolution and the class war. We must remember there have been such things as the French, and, later, the Russian revolutions ; while the advocacy of class war contains possibilities which would simply transfer strife from one dimension to another, namely, from longitudinal war between nations to latitudinal war between classes ; which would be far worse. The war-fatalists can point out that the necessities of life involve struggle, the divergencies of personality precipitate clash, and impatient man is always likely to settle his differences by a hasty appeal to force.

Nevertheless, it can be pointed out in reply that the appeal to force has already been abandoned over large areas of life, and that without any great change being first brought about in human nature. For instance, piracy and banditage always disappear under civilisation ; the duel has not only been suppressed through the inhibition of law, but has been abandoned for recourse to law ; economic competition between cities and industrial areas

no longer leads to war, nor to racial antipathies, when these have been gathered together in one State or Empire. England, Wales, Scotland, and quite recently Ireland, were once engaged in bitter warfare. And it would be agreed that remote as it is to be hoped is the possibility of war between Great Britain and the United States, this would be even further diminished if the United States became a part of the British Empire, like Canada.

But what does this gradual elimination of war through inclusion in the same State really indicate? Does it mean that war is gradually working itself out, moving from a smaller to a greater area, until at last it disappears? Or does it mean that war is only finding a worse expression on a larger scale? It is very difficult to give a dogmatic answer to that question. The hope of the former alternative depends upon the emergence of a world-State, and that is certainly far away, and probably unattainable.

The League of Nations represents a mediating proposal; is it likely to solve the problem? There is no doubt that it constitutes the most practical proposal for the prevention of war so far made. It is far more definite than any other modern peace proposal; more thought has been given to it; there is great desire and force behind it; and although the support

given to it is still insufficient, it has probably gained more than any previous proposal. Let us briefly recall what the Covenant of the League of Nations attempts to secure. It pledges all the signatory nations to :

1. The reduction of armaments ;
2. The submission of international quarrels to arbitration ;
3. The promise not to go to war until three months after an award has been made ;
4. And to combine to resist any nation that infringes these conditions.

The addition of what is called the Protocol endeavours to close every possible loophole left in the original Covenant, by providing for compulsory arbitration for all disputes, even when the League is not unanimous, and even when the dispute arises among nations that are not signatory to the Covenant ; and for action to be taken against any aggressor, the aggressor being defined as any nation which refuses to submit to arbitration or accept the final award, but instead goes to war ; while all the signatory States are obliged to apply economic and military force as the League shall direct. Although the Protocol has roused considerable criticism, it does not go beyond the Covenant in principle, and it has secured the signature of every representative in the League.

It will be admitted by the League's most enthusiastic exponents that its proposals do not abolish war, or give an absolute guarantee against its outbreak. All that is claimed is that the League will diminish the likelihood of war. It is acknowledged that there will be war, and a war in which the whole League will be implicated, if any State becomes an aggressor under the definitions of the Covenant. But the possibilities of war are limited, first, by the unlikelihood of the various processes of arbitration failing to give satisfaction ; secondly, by the unlikelihood that any nation would risk taking action which would array all the other signatories against it ; and thirdly, by the likely psychological effect of the armistice which, under the proposals of the Protocol, the League would impose, even if all the processes of arbitration came to nothing. The armistice could be imposed for any length of time ; and if the armistice were broken by any nation, that nation would immediately become the aggressor nation, and the others must resist or attack it.

The obvious danger is in some big State preferring to take action without arbitration, and of the rest refusing to act ; or, on the other hand, if they did act, in these circumstances there would be the danger of every war developing into a world war.

Looking at the possibilities quite objectively, we have to conclude that the League of Nations makes it less likely that war will break out, but likely to be all the worse if it does. Every war is likely to become a world war, and if the aggressor happens to be a strong nation, and no other nation would dare to be the aggressor, it would be exactly like the last war, and perhaps worse. Everything depends, therefore, on the willingness of nations to accept and faithfully keep the conditions of the League. It must be noted that, at present, all nations are not in the League. The United States, Germany, and Russia are, for different reasons, still outside, and this fact constitutes three considerable danger points. Then it is open to question how far governments, not to speak of nations, consider themselves actually bound by the Covenant. For instance, the Protocol has been signed by all the representatives in the League, but it has yet to be ratified by the Governments, and it is quite probable that it may not be. Moreover, even if peoples were democratically pledged, and not merely through their governments, parliaments, or representatives on the League, would any pledge bind a nation if it felt really aggrieved, or if it was felt that its honour had been touched? Consider, for instance, the possibility if some trouble developed in India,

which was deemed to pass beyond a merely "domestic quarrel," which is purposely excluded, although the Protocol says the League must decide what is a domestic matter; and suppose that India appealed to the League, and the League decided that Britain must give up India: we can imagine what might happen! And we are the nicest people in the world!

Everything still depends on the psychology of peoples; it is the psychology of peoples that has to be changed, and this is rooted in fundamental, human instincts. The sense of national honour is a thing quite different from the individual sense of honour. Mass feeling can be roused by an event which would not rouse many individuals. If any one steals our pocket-handkerchief, we may be faintly irritated; but if any one tears down a Union Jack, millions of people want to avenge the insult. If one of our family was murdered in the old days the family might have taken up the feud; but if an Englishman happens to be murdered by a person of another nationality, the whole nation may take up the feud.

National honour is a sort of mass consciousness, and rests on a most irrational basis, but it may take much less to arouse it than it would to arouse a rational individual. Moreover, however much racial consciousness may be

founded, as anthropology must declare it is, on sheer phantasy, it can be appealed to and worked up very easily, and it is impervious to argument. Probably one reason why this racial consciousness is so easily touched is that it is bound up with fear. It is conceivable that the fear of the possible results of war might inhibit the recourse to war undertaken to prevent something that was feared: one fear might drive out the other. But the fear of the possible results of an appeal to war is counteracted by the appeal to noble instincts. There is the instinct of bravery, which encourages us to face trouble, and be careless of the consequences. Secondly, it is unselfish to be concerned for a larger thing than oneself, namely, one's country.

> "Who lives if England dies; who dies if England lives?

The soul that cannot respond to that estimate writes itself down as a mean soul. And, thirdly, the idea of sacrifice for a great cause touches the deepest religious instinct in man.

Now, it is perfectly true that these noble instincts are mixed up with others, and sometimes confused with them; namely, the aggressive instinct, which is very strong in us all; and, secondly, false patriotism, which at the best mistakes what is a country's real life, is often not so much love of one's own people as hatred

of foreigners, and at its worst is "the last refuge of a scoundrel." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the dominant aim of warfare is not to sacrifice yourself in a great cause, but, to put it quite bluntly, to sacrifice somebody else if possible. Men do not go into battle to lay down their lives; the primary object is to prevent any one forcing themselves, or their fellow-citizens, to lay down their lives. But in warfare the good instincts, which are few, carry the bad ones, which are many, on their backs.

This analysis, reluctantly undertaken, and generally bitterly resisted, indicates the deep-seated psychological roots of war which must be cut before war will be destroyed. And the necessary change is not, apparently, going to be effected by education. It is when educated nations go to war that war shows its worst features: brutalities are not much less than if it were a war between savages; and modern means of communication, and the deliberate adoption of mass suggestion, make it much more difficult to bring a war to an end. Moreover, education is itself quite indeterminate; people can be educated to almost any end. You can apparently educate people more easily in national pride and for militaristic ends than against them. It is questionable whether any other fear is able to cast out the war fear; save, perhaps, the fear of God. It is, therefore,

important to notice that the League of Nations still appeals to fear as the ultimate defence against war. But suppose you had one nation opposed by all the nations of the world, and it yet believed it was right and all the others wrong, as nations often do, then merely not to go to war because all other nations were against you would be no argument with the brave. We shall have to show that war itself is motived by fear, and at bottom the fear of being killed ; so until you can make men no longer afraid of being killed, you will not end war. This means that to prevent war we must undertake the conversion of the human mind, the transvaluation of our social morals, the transformation of our most deeply rooted instincts ; everything ultimately depends upon that.

Can Christ solve this problem ? Not if the present state of Christianity indicates the extent of His power or the meaning of His mind. In the first place, Christianity is so hopelessly divided. There are the sectarian divisions of the Church, which make any widespread, authoritative action on the part of the Church inconceivable. Probably the Roman Church alone possesses sufficiently universal or effective authority to deal with a war crisis. But how effective that authority is, we should never know until there arose some crucial issue between nation and Church.

What action the Roman Church took during the war was purely hortative, and even then the Papal action only roused suspicion and charges of favouritism or timid neutrality; though it is interesting to notice that suspicion and criticism were aroused equally on both sides in the great struggle. It must be said in all fairness that the appeals of Benedict xv., which were often censored and suppressed, were on a higher Christian level than the utterance of most ecclesiastics; but with equal fairness it must be said that they were ignored, not only by all nations but almost equally by most Roman Catholics. Therefore until some great change takes place in the convictions and courage of the Christian Church, there seems little hope of effective ecclesiastical influence.

But it is the division in Christian thought which is a still greater hindrance. There is deep disagreement among Christian people as to what was Christ's actual attitude towards war; whether He was unconcerned, whether He accepted it, whether He sanctioned it under certain conditions, or whether He completely prohibited it to His followers. The Roman Church, for instance, is pledged to the doctrine that there is such a thing as a just war, and that resistance to aggression is legitimate. There was a rumour current since the

war that the Roman Church was threatening to excommunicate individuals who invaded another country bearing arms. This might have been at the same time a subtle evasion of the point at issue, and an effective inhibition of military aggression; but it was probably only a rumour, and it has been denied at headquarters. Moreover, the difficulty of defining aggression remains, although this has been seriously attempted by the Protocol to the League of Nations Covenant. But it is quite obvious, to any military mind at least, that the best means of defence is often aggression, and diplomats generally try to force their opponents to aggressive action or to conceal theirs from their own people. As long as there are different levels of morality among nations, there will always be aggression, someone must always be the aggressor, and on this theory, therefore, every war will always be just for one of the parties. The Roman Catholic theory therefore prevents war being prohibited as unchristian.

There are some Christians, however, who hold different views from this. Many hold that, of course, Christianity condemns war, and that you must not go to war if there is any other way; but if there is not, then it is sanctioned by necessity. Others hold that war would be abolished quite simply by

every one becoming Christian ; though even the most hopeful must believe that this postpones its abolition for centuries at least. The net result is that Christians look upon war very much as other persons do ; they hold different opinions, and the practical difference they make is therefore negligible.

The conversion of Christendom, as well as the conversion of the world, has apparently, therefore, to be undertaken before war can be abolished. That is a difficult proposition ; but the attention of some Christians, who believe that Christianity does not forbid war, might be drawn to the alarming fact that Christianity is fast becoming the last and the only sanction for war at all. There is no longer any economic sanction for it, for, under modern conditions, the victor is bound to come off just as badly as the vanquished. There can be no sanction for war as a means of self-defence, for there is no assurance that you will win, or if you do, that you will be any better off than if you lost. And most people who have had anything to do with fighting declare that there is nothing moral about it. Therefore, Christianity remains its last sanction.

And yet until Christendom is converted to a radical prohibition of war there is probably no hope for the world ; for as long as the last resort is force, it is the last resort that will

generally be tried first ; and as long as resistance to aggression is sanctioned, then preparations against aggression must be made, which means not only huge armaments, but spying and other indecent things, and such measures when you are at war as make it certain that no further aggression from that quarter will ever be possible. And it is doubtful whether the disarmament proposals of the League, even if carried out, would get rid of the apprehension that is one of the most fruitful causes of war. Yet the logical alternative of no preparation, and no resistance, might involve a nation in enslavement, economic starvation, or complete destruction ; and this few are willing to consider.

What hope is there, then, for the rise of what may be called Christian Pacifism? Pacifism is a somewhat new conception, which has yet to win the approval even of the Christian Church, and is mostly ridiculed, feared, and hated by the world. It is corporately held by practically only one denomination, the Society of Friends, which holds all war to be unchristian, and therefore urges Christians to take no part in it. That the Church has yet to be won to this view does not show that the view is necessarily wrong. The Church had not only to be educated on a question like slavery, but had even to be screwed up to

complete doctrinal orthodoxy. It involves no more reflection on the past that this question should be now raised, than in the fact that slavery was once tolerated by good Christians. The modern condemnation of war does not involve the idea that nothing good has ever come of war, or that it has not been used by God for the education and the chastening of mankind. But it has to go now simply because humanity has developed an irrepressible conscience on the subject.

Christian Pacifism must not, however, be confused with other types founded, for instance, on Buddhistic or merely humanitarian grounds; it need not be identified with anti-ecclesiastical, anti-dogmatic, and anti-sacramental interpretations of Christianity; nor should it be thought to rest upon the private interpretation of certain texts, although no doctrine can ever find its way to Christian acceptance unless it can be authoritatively shown that no relevant text is contrary to it. But the plea for Pacifism can find strong ground in the moral law, as that is expressed in the Ten Commandments; for one of them prohibits murder, and war must always be murder on one side or the other. Moreover, the complete condemnation of war, and the prohibition of warfare to Christians, can find weighty support in the writings of the Early

Fathers. It can be built upon the method of the Incarnation, which seeks to convert the world, not by thunderbolts, but by disarming men ; it can plead the doctrine of the Atonement and the way of the Cross as an unambiguous example ; and it can appeal to the sacramental philosophy to show that no material thing must be used without a reference to its spiritual end. It can be claimed that Pacifism is implicitly involved in the vows of the Priesthood and the Religious Orders. Priests are not allowed to bear arms or shed blood ; and it is, therefore, perfectly open for any one to say, " I feel my vows as a Christian involve my not shedding blood." You may kill a man who takes that position, but you cannot say that it is wrong ; such vows are already recognised as right for some to take, and therefore right for every one voluntarily to assume. No Church which calls itself Catholic can condemn this individual adoption of resistance to bearing arms ; it can only condemn the enforcement of such a position on those who feel no such call or conviction. And the resistance of the Roman Catholic Church to Pacifism, which some of its opponents would like to see condemned as a heresy, may be turned by admitting that it may be legitimate to defend oneself or one's country, but that there is a higher

consideration than what is lawful and right, namely, what is the way of love and redemption, and there the Cross provides a sufficient and unambiguous answer.

But it is precisely at this point of the individual refusal to bear arms that opposition to Pacifism becomes tense and determined. Any pacific opinion is tolerated so long as it does not lead to this particular action. There is no need to deny that this attitude may be motived by cowardice; it has often been defended by wrong arguments; it spoils its own case if it demands legal protection; and it provokes almost universal hostility and ostracism. But these considerations are beside the point. Indeed, an elaborate defence of this attitude need not be undertaken, for this attitude is one that will resist all argument, and it has come to stay. It is likely to increase, especially in those countries where individual enlightenment is common; it is already playing an important part in stirring the conscience of mankind, and it cannot possibly be repressed by legislation or by coercion; not disfranchisement, imprisonment, or even the death penalty would make any other difference to the numbers of conscientious objectors save to increase them still more. Hatred and fear of this attitude will not diminish the fact, and when it reaches sufficient dimensions, it may

plunge some nation into a catastrophe of defencelessness and military disgrace. Such a catastrophe is likely to happen first to the most moral and idealistic nation, for it is there that conscientious objectors will be found in greatest number. Let those who hate this movement reflect that it was England that produced more conscientious objectors than all the other nations put together ; and probably Germany that produced least. But it will be on this or on some similar issue that patriotic perverts and conventional churchmen will have to discover that Christianity is a religion which is highly dangerous to military methods and State worship. Either Christianity or worldly policy must be surrendered, and all people will soon be forced to make up their mind which they will choose to retain. It will be a dreadful dilemma for many, but it is not too early for them to make the discovery that Christ did not shed His blood to sanctify the ways of the world or to establish mankind in its conventions and compromises.

On the other side, however, it has to be considered that it is the willingness of peoples to fight that chains the world to the way of war. All politicians and diplomats proceed on the assumption that when war is declared people will be willing to fight, and they will not declare war unless they are ready for it.

If we are not prepared for war, and people are no longer willing to fight, diplomats and politicians will begin to think differently. There are unpleasant consequences to contemplate, and no assurance is here offered that they may not involve a catastrophe ; but it is unlikely that the world is going to be saved from war save at cost and risk ; here, again, the way of the Cross may be the only way of redemption. But the risk is no more than the way of war involves ; that may mean defeat, disaster, or destruction. Even the League of Nations Covenant does not promise to abolish war, but only to decrease its possibility and likelihood. It relies still upon the threat and fear of war ; and we have been warned that Satan does not usually consent to cast out Satan. It is possible to hold that the reliance on military sanctions might be expunged from the Covenant, if only in its place there was put the democratic pledge of the peoples, secured by referendum, to abide by the conditions of the Covenant to submit to arbitration all matters which might lead to war, and not to go to war until some agreed period after the award had been promulgated. For whole peoples are not so likely to go back on their word as governments or parliaments. But even then there is no absolute reliance upon mass opinion ; so that the risks of war and of destruction remain. But it must be stated just as clearly

that neither is there any absolute assurance that the unwillingness to go to war on the part of a large number of Christians, or of all Christians, or of a whole nation, would necessarily abolish war. It might only involve for any nation that adopted disarmament or non-resistance, loss of prestige, political or economic bondage, crucifixion, death. Since the possibilities of war cannot be abolished, the issue narrows down to this : whether humanity is going on committing itself to a course which it is beginning to feel is sin, and that because it is afraid of being destroyed ; or whether it is going to take the risk of destruction because it is no longer afraid of being destroyed. Just as there are good hopes that the League of Nations will make war unlikely, so there is good hope that a nation which agreed to fight would break the great war delusion ; or even if it were put to death for its temerity, that it would rise again. But in this world there can be no guarantees even of this. We should then have to fall back on the spiritual estimate that it was better to be destroyed for righteousness than to buy existence at the price of evil. Nor is this spiritual estimate beyond attainment. After all, what could kill England ? The Ancient Greeks are all dead, but Greece lives as potent a force as ever. National existence is not a political but a spiritual reality ; and the true patriot

will fight for that, and not for imperial sway or military supremacy.

It is this spiritual estimate that Christ would certainly teach the world if it were willing to learn. If men would follow Him they must not be afraid of being killed, and must be willing to be killed rather than commit the sin of killing. It is the fear of sin, that is, the fear of God, which alone can destroy the fear of war. And if the taking of such an attitude only led to the loss of power, place, wealth, security, freedom, or even existence, Christianity would still bid us, on issue, to choose eternal life rather than earthly existence. Nations are under no different law, as we have already seen. So that, after all, on the most matter-of-fact lines the issue stands simply like this: nations must now take the risk whether they will be destroyed by going to war or be destroyed by not going to war. The chances are fairly equal on either side, so that, after all, it is the same risk, but undertaken for different motives. Those who believe this world is not all, that God reigns and is alone ultimately real, ought to know which way mankind must move to find salvation.

Chapter VIII — *Christian Ethics and Economic Sufficiency*

ALTHOUGH it has come to be widely recognised that religion and economics are the two great forces which have moulded human history, there are very few who recognise that there is any sort of vital connection between the two. Many are only conscious of their opposition. It is thought that economics belongs to the realm of law, and therefore that religion can have no more influence upon economics than it can have upon gravitation. Others hold that economics is law, but man-made law, and they feel that the only effect of religion in the past has been to make men accept certain laws as divine or submit to them as unalterable, when, as a matter of fact, having been made by man, they could have been altered by man. There is some truth in the opposition of religion and economics, but it is simply this, that, while economics rests upon an unalterable natural basis, namely, the fertility of the soil and the adaptability of natural forces, and so far comes under scientific law, actual production is due to the application of human agency to these

things, and depends upon the amount of labour, the attention of mind, and the efficiency of organisation that man is willing to expend. And these influences involve not only man's physical powers, but his moral conceptions and his religious ideals. The so-called " law of supply and demand " to which appeal is so often made in economic discussions embraces these two diverse elements. There is not only the bare craving for life's necessities, which is almost as strong as a natural force, but there is a demand also for other things, which depend upon man's interest and provision, the kind of amusements or recreations that he cares for, avarice, his æsthetic taste, and a thousand other subjective and variable factors. It is only within certain narrow limits that economics rests upon strictly natural law and can, therefore, be reduced to a strict science. We must not be misled on this point because we can compile statistics and make financial calculations, for they deal with things that are ultimately variable ; they are not to be taken as fixed or governed by unyielding law because they happen to yield averages and to follow mathematical laws. For instance, you can so calculate the average age at which persons die, so calculate what the insurance companies call their expectancy of life, that, given a large number of people, you can offer them insurance

at a certain rate and be certain never to lose but only to make money by the transaction. But that does not tell you when any single person embraced in that scheme will die. The operation of the law of averages and its non-relation to individual facts is often overlooked.

Now, it is the interaction of variable human personality and the operation of natural law which constitute the difficulty of the science of economics ; and it should make us equally suspicious, on the one hand, of those economic theories which declare that economic laws forbid any adaptation to human aspirations, or, on the other hand, of infallible predictions about the effect of economic reforms, which often equally disregard human personality as a practically negligible thing. Economics, therefore, rests on natural science on the one hand, but, on the other, it ultimately touches the realm of theology. In our opinion about economic facts, not only is there considerable ignorance about the basis of economics, and what finance actually rests upon, but, just as in theology, the condition of man's own heart may deflect his judgment, so economic judgments are often motived by moral, or immoral, considerations. Hence the obscurity of the subject, the dogmatic theorisings on either side, and the heart-burning which gathers about it.

Religion can therefore profoundly influence economic facts, for good or for ill. It might be effectually enlisted to prevent economic reform, or it might alone make possible or successful far-reaching economic changes. Therefore, if Christ is the most effective force in religion, He must have some effective relation to economics. Christ certainly claimed dominance even over the economic realm. He did that, in general, when He claimed dominion over all realms: "All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth." But this claim of Christ is disputed by two otherwise opposed groups of people. It is disputed, for instance, by the secular social theorist: the economic determinist who traces all ideals, including religion, to economic conditions, so that he believes you can change these conditions without consulting religion; indeed, under changed conditions religion would change and might disappear.

On the other side, you have the religious economist who believes economics to be wholly a matter of natural law, and, while believing in religion in its own sphere, believes that religion has nothing whatever to do with economics, and cannot possibly influence it. But these two groups of economic theories are countered by the opinion which holds

that religion is the greatest hindrance to great economic changes ; either because religion is supposed to sanction certain economic arrangements as divine, for instance, the legalisation of private property, or because religion makes the poor content with their condition, preaching to them either an interior peace or future compensation, and thus preventing them from resisting the economic robbery from which it is alleged they suffer. Religion on this theory is supposed to act either as an intoxicant or as " dope." As an intoxicant it makes you happy when you have no right to be, and as a sedative it shuts your eyes to facts and makes you insensitive even to the most miserable conditions.

In partial agreement with these critics of religion are some pious persons who believe that religion is meant to make men indifferent to social reforms and economic conditions, and that this is a sign of its elevating and superior power ; and they appeal to Christ Himself as confessedly uninterested in economics. Texts can be quoted in support of this contention. For instance, when Christ was asked by a man to bid his brother divide his inheritance with him, He deliberately refused, saying, " Who made me a judge or a divider over you ? " Now, that Christ claimed that He had nothing to do with such matters is a

very doubtful interpretation of that text. If you will only say that text aloud and not simply read it, you will find that, to sustain this interpretation, the words must be given a scornful tone that it is difficult to believe Christ could have used on this occasion. Say the words in the calm way that would be demanded by the circumstances, and you will see that what He meant was, " If you are going to submit this economic problem to me, you must recognise the supreme position I hold in the disposition of human affairs." In confirmation of the idea that this saying is not a repudiation of economic concern, it must be noted that it is immediately followed by a statement of indisputable economic bearing, perhaps one of the most important on this subject which the New Testament contains ; for Christ went on to say, " Keep yourselves from all covetousness ; for a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which He possesseth." In order to bring out the profound economic bearing of the saying, it needs to be translated a little more forcefully : " A man's life consisteth not in possessing a superabundance of things over which he can exercise absolute claim." This gives a very different sound to the saying, but such is its clear intention.

Take, again, the text often quoted in this

connection, namely, Christ's reply to the First Temptation in the Wilderness, where, when the devil bade Christ turn the stones to bread, He answered, "Man doth not live by bread alone." It has been suggested by some expositors that this temptation was really aimed at turning Christ from His religious mission by the seduction of social reform; He was tempted to feed men with bread rather than with God's truth. It must be noted that this is a highly metaphorical interpretation of the First Temptation. It might have that implication, but there is no indication for it, and anyhow it presses the distinction between spiritual religion and social reform crudely and too far; for it should also be noted that our Lord did not respond: "Man can live by the Word of God alone." Christ knew that man needed bread as well as the Word. So in the very centre of the Lord's Prayer we find the words, "Give us this day our daily bread." This shows that our Lord was an economic realist. He recognised that man had physical needs that had to be satisfied.

And if we leave appeals to disputable texts, we can find Christ's attitude positively summed up in clear and far-reaching principles. It is sometimes said that religion ought to enable a man to live under any conditions. To which the answer is, So it does; but the

point at issue is, not whether a man can live *under* any conditions, but whether he ought to live *on* any conditions. You may be strong enough to suffer under them, but ought you to profit by them? For instance, his conditions did not make any religious difference to Lazarus, but they made all the difference to the destiny of the rich man.

But it is sometimes suggested that the poor ought to be content, since Christ praised poverty and condemned covetousness. But even suppose that the poverty He praised was what we mean by poverty, namely, necessary indigence, or miserable destitution, and not voluntarily assumed poverty, which is much more likely, yet this appeal cuts two ways; for if we are going to make much of the fact that Christ praised poverty, we must make as much of the fact that He condemned riches as one of the greatest dangers of the soul, so much so that He declared it was only by the omnipotence of God that a rich man could enter the kingdom of heaven; and that probably does not mean that it is only God's omnipotence that can change the conditions, but that it is only His omnipotence that enables a rich man to unload sufficiently to qualify for the Kingdom. It is the present possession of the kingdom of God which alone can regulate human avarice; it would make

us all content with a modest, earned, secure livelihood: something quite different from either modern riches or poverty.

Then it is objected that religion must influence society by purely personal and voluntary methods. All organised coercive attempts to change conditions are impossible and mistaken. Personal charity there may and must be, in order to relieve the poverty around you; beyond that nothing else need or can be done. Almsgiving, not socialism, is the remedy of the Catholic Church.

It can be shown that Christ's teaching has much more direct bearing on the economic situation. It must be noticed that He condemns economic anxiety. Christ realised how anxiety for the common necessaries of life can absorb and engage the mind until it turns it from its greater concerns; not only from religion, but from the very business of living and even from the health of the body: "The life is more than meat, and the body than raiment." Now, was His advice and exhortation simply that men should cultivate a more trustful spirit, and believe that their heavenly Father, who feeds the birds and clothes the flowers, would provide for them, and in the same way, without any effort on their part? This might seem so if we did not understand our Lord's peculiar way of emphasising the course

recommended without intending to exclude the other, which was equally necessary, but lower ; and were it not that He goes on to explain that we are to seek first God's kingdom and His righteousness, and then all other necessaries will be added. Now, to seek the kingdom of God and His righteousness, is to be concerned for the two great factors of religion and justice. The latter is obviously a human and an economic concern. Religion is between God and man ; justice is between man and man, and must therefore be man's aim and establishment. It is clear that our Lord believed that the establishment of the kingdom of God would take away the necessity for economic anxiety, and would secure to every man, not a careful and niggardly sufficiency, but a liberal and beautiful sufficiency. This is demanded by His reference to the birds of the air and the flowers of the field. He desired our life to be at least as free from care and as beautifully provided for as theirs.

This must not be regarded as a piece of poetic idealism without any consideration for how it is to be practically realised. It must be remembered that the teaching of Jesus, although apparently simple, has always been found by those who have studied it to be of the most profound character. It must be

remembered, for instance, how much our Lord assumed. He assumed the whole of the prophetic teaching. The Old Testament, and especially the Prophets, were, to Him, of divine inspiration, and their political and economic concern, which no one would dream of denying, is assumed by Jesus to be felt and understood. What He is concerned with in regard to the Law and the Prophets is not their abolition, but their fulfilment. This He looks for through the inauguration of the New Covenant and the establishment of the Kingdom. It is not an accident that the Old Testament is bound up with the New: the New carries with it everything in the Old which it does not abrogate. Our Lord's simplicity must not lead us to suppose that, because He was faced by simple conditions, His teaching is only applicable to simple conditions; the economic conditions of His time were already complicated, and in essence much the same as our own; and if He did not deal directly with them, as He did not with slavery and military service, for instance, it was not because He had nothing to say about them, but because He was cutting beneath the whole system which supported them; the axe was being laid to the root of the tree, Christ was not concerned with merely pruning the branches. Moreover, the absence of a

detailed programme does not mean His followers are not to have a programme. Jesus presents us with great principles which He has left to His followers in every generation to work out and apply. But these principles sufficiently challenge the commonly accepted basis of worldly life. Christ tells us, "You cannot worship God and Mammon"; He says that men should make the heavenly and not the earthly treasure their concern; and if it is desired to express those principles in modern language it means, "Souls before property, and service rather than gain."

It must be remembered also that our Lord founded the Church for the carrying out of His will, and the idea of a Church carries with it the sanctification of organised and corporate effort. Moreover, our Lord instituted a food-and-drink Sacrament; and that carries with it a far-reaching application to the sanctification of our necessities as a means of union between God and man.

It is only an anti-ecclesiastical and anti-sacramental interpretation of Christianity, indeed a completely heretical Christianity, that can preach indifferentism to economic concerns as sufficient.

But how is Christ's economic teaching to be carried out in modern life? There is a

growing conviction that His teaching condemns the present order. Our modern industrial civilisation is obviously all too far from the spirit of the Gospel. Its confessed motive is enlightened self-interest and personal profit, not the common good and the gain of all. Its estimate of value is the abundance of possessions. Its one means of functioning is what we call capital, and capital, in the modern meaning of hoarded treasure, is as near a modern translation of the New Testament word Mammon as we can get. Moreover, modern industrialism is founded on the repudiation of the ecclesiastical economics which were worked out in theory and largely adopted in practice in the Middle Ages ; and if extreme economists regard that as only a compromise, nevertheless it was better than anything we have now in its recognition of principle and right. It rested on the threefold basis, Private Property, Just Price, and No Usury. Our modern system has retained only one item out of the three, namely, private property, and that without limit. The word itself tells us that it has limits. " Property " is that which is proper ; what is often defended as property ought rather to be called " Improperty." Moreover, private property was recognised to be a kind of necessity due to the Fall, and therefore it had to be kept

in place by the operation of two other limiting safeguards, the Just Price and No Usury.

The modern system fosters precisely that anxiety which Christ exhorted men to flee. Men are taken up with the concern of food and clothes, either because they have too much, so that they spend half their lives deciding what they shall choose, or because, on the other hand, they have not enough. There is anxiety with the two extremes of the very rich and the very poor : and the very idea of fulfilling the Gospel literally and " Taking no thought " can only appear to us the veriest madness ; it looks as though nobody but a tramp or a beggar could follow it ; but this only because we have overlooked the basis on which this exhortation is made. That there is neither understanding of the Gospel nor any way of carrying it out, is the biggest condemnation of the present order that could be quoted.

But it is not only the Gospel that condemns the industrial system ; its development is beginning to cause consternation among thoughtful and far-seeing minds. It might be argued that civilisation has succeeded just in so far as it has taken no notice of Jesus Christ. The struggle of every one to get rich has released that enormous energy which

has built up the tremendous wealth of this world. Enlightened self-interest actually works in an almost miraculously successful way. It is nobody's business to see I get my breakfast to-morrow: it is everybody's business to see that he gets his own; but this has the effect of bringing every one's breakfast to his table to-morrow. Why it should work like this is a matter for the greatest wonder, if only people were given to wondering at really wonderful things. It has been claimed that the capitalist system enables us to make complete provision against the possibility of famine. By saving up we have something when the rainy day arrives. Again, it can be claimed that the industrial system of "division of labour" and "mass production" has given us cheap and abundant supplies, not only of necessities but of luxuries, recreations, and even æsthetic satisfaction. Raphael could paint only one Sistine Madonna. We can now turn them out by the thousand; though the result is to make one sick of the Sistine Madonna!

Yet despite these successes the tendencies of industrialism are beginning to awaken suspicion and alarm. The enormous riches thus created seem inevitably to carry with them a corresponding poverty. Wages are everywhere rising, but commodities grow dearer.

Our cities are better drained than the countryside, but their inhabitants have to pay a heavy toll in lack of air, sunshine, and beauty. The factory system has entailed a great loss of liberty, and the destruction of any creative joy in work. The mere financial gain is almost entirely cancelled out, first, by periods of unemployment; and, secondly, by the steady rise of prices. This is beginning to make even the dullest person open his eyes. It was once thought to be due to the war; but really it has been going on ever since the industrial revolution; and inevitably, for despite its promise of cheapening everything, its concentration upon profits rather than upon production tempts every one away from the provision of necessities, which bring less profit, to the production of ephemeral luxuries, and especially to finance and speculation, which hold out the promise of making a private fortune without adding anything to the general wealth. Finally, the industrial system has given birth to the class war. It may be that the class war, like racial antipathy, is founded upon a delusion, and is fostered by a class-consciousness of which no scientific or rational explanation can be given; but it is a psychological factor of enormous importance which threatens to tear modern society to pieces by fear and hate. It must be remembered that

although the class-war may be openly preached only by one extreme, class-consciousness has been fostered by the other. There are people who have a hatred for the working classes, and it is contempt for them and the freely expressed idea that there are classes who belong naturally, and ought to be kept to a lower level, which has had the unexpected effect of making these classes class-conscious, proud of belonging to their class, convinced in the belief that they are alone necessary and powerful, and determined to secure their domination. This threatened class-war has already produced in Europe the twin phenomena of Bolshevism and Fascism, both relying upon and appealing to force to keep the other side down. These are menaces which are not to be cajoled or argued away ; for they spring from a system which must be altered before the way of reconciliation can be found, and trust can be recovered.

The enormous success of industrialism, which has so blinded our eyes to its real character, is partly due to its recent introduction, for it is hardly two hundred years old, and to its being originally confined to one or two areas. For instance, Britain was the first industrial country, and we have certainly made money and achieved supremacy by it, but now the rapid industrialising of other countries is creating

fierce competition, and a challenge to our trade which is threatening not only our supremacy, but our prosperity and perhaps even our existence. For there is a natural tendency in industrialism to neglect, first, agriculture, second, the production of necessaries, and, third, productive work of any kind, and to turn to manufacture, luxury trades, the multiplication of distribution agencies, the ambition merely to manage other people's work, or to live on interest. The general tendency of industrialism is to carry energy farther and farther away from the production of fundamental necessities, to put the basal necessity of agriculture out to others; and as the temptation of industrialism increases and the areas for the production of food and raw materials shrink, a world crisis develops which must in the end spell world starvation.

Before that stage is reached, or revolution overwhelms civilisation, we may be shaken to pieces by financial collapse. It is very doubtful whether even the best financial experts can tell us what money represents or on what financial security really depends. But the plain man knows it is very easily disturbed, that money has a way of vanishing most mysteriously; and that the financial system seems to be no longer functioning as a true means of exchange, but is a positive hindrance. It would be an ironical

justification of the teaching of Jesus if Mammon, to Him God's only serious competitor for the worship of man, should turn out to be a delusion. It may be that wealth is something you cannot really hoard. Wealth may consist only in the latent capacity of nature and man's willingness to work; while money is nothing more than a lien upon future work. Hence the natural nervousness whenever one even criticises the present system; you must not criticise it; you hardly dare breathe upon it; it is so frail and unstable because it largely rests on a delusion; for it really depends on men working, and if they stopped, the system would collapse.

Various proposals are therefore being put forward to reform our economic system; but these, for one reason or another, are resisted. We shall mention briefly only those which have received some measure of exposition and criticism. There is what is commonly called Socialism. A famous politician once declared, "We are all socialists nowadays." It was not true then save in the vaguest sense, and it is meaningless now when different and contradictory theories are, unfortunately, bracketed together under Socialism; for this only enables its opponents to condemn every type and confuses its exponents. But what might be called Absolute State Socialism proposes that

all the means of production, distribution, and exchange shall be owned by the community. This, it is believed, would eliminate private profit, prevent monopoly, and secure the equitable distribution of wealth. This system is resisted because it is supposed it would destroy private enterprise, the spring of social progress ; it would involve an army of bureaucrats, and make the State the director of business, for which it often seems most incompetent. But all sane discussion of the system is overwhelmed by political animus, the fear of confiscation, and in the idea that bloody revolution, atheism, and free love are its inevitable concomitants. But Socialism is all a matter of degree. It depends upon how much you think should be socialised ; moreover, it could be done very gradually. It could be introduced quite democratically, on the agreement of a majority of the people ; it could proceed by experiment on a small scale, and extended if it proved a success. Yet Socialism is often spoken of as if it were something belonging to the unknown future, a dangerous experiment which might have all kinds of dreadful results ; whereas in degree it is already in existence and is accepted. Roads, the postal system, water, lighting, tramways, shipping, are already socialised. At a recent election, the awful cry was raised that people were proposing to socialise

banks. But it has already been done. Any one walking down the Strand can see the building of a socialised bank, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Socialistic proposals have been mixed up, as we know, with certain anti-religious views, they have been proclaimed with menace, urged as only realisable by revolution and coercion, and associated with a revolutionary morality. This may be as unfortunate as it is foolish; but the belief in force as the last appeal is found among others beside socialists, and so is the advocacy and practice of sexual irregularity.

An entirely different proposal is contained in the idea of Co-operation. This agrees with Socialism in that it pools profits, but differs from it in that it is a voluntary enterprise undertaken without the aid of the State. These proposals have already been realised in the great trading Co-operative Societies that now exist. It has been suggested that the co-operative organisation of agriculture might relieve the present agricultural distress. It is in line with this principle that it is proposed to revive the Guild System in order to establish companies of craftsmen owning their own capital and machinery and managing themselves. Houses have already been erected under this system, and other efforts have been started, though as yet the enterprise is in its

infancy. It must be pointed out that such ventures do not necessarily fulfil high social ideals. Such organisations could become as avaricious and tyrannical as private or company concerns.

An interesting proposal known as the Social Credit Scheme would look to a purely financial adjustment of credit, which it is believed would revolutionise our economic system without any great disturbance. The system is difficult to understand ; it seems to excite enthusiastic conviction and contemptuous dismissal almost equally. It cannot be more than mentioned here ; but it is hard to believe that all present distresses are going to be relieved merely, as it were, by a stroke of the pen.

A final proposal may be mentioned ; it is that of taking up the old mediæval economics and bringing them up to date. That means, instead of the abolition of private property, its increase and extension among small property owners, but with strict limitations. Private property must be that which can be used, and not employed as power ; and it is generally agreed that there must be a limit as to how much can be handed on to heirs. It involves the attempt to fix prices and so prevent cornering and extortion. And as a modern adaptation of the " no usury " principle it is proposed

to limit the payment of interest and rent, so that when an amount sufficiently exceeding the capital or value to represent deferred payment and risk has been paid, the capital is regarded as repaid, or a house as purchased. These proposals have awakened considerable interest among moderate economists, and something like this seems to be just and necessary if the undue power and accumulation of money is to be prevented, and industry is no longer to be saddled with an impossible burden.

Probably what is wanted is a combination of these systems ; the socialisation of certain fundamental supplies ; co-operation for many industries, crafts, and distributive trades ; legislation to control financial arrangements ; and any amount of private enterprise for which room will still be left. But our concern is with the criticism or sanction these could receive from religious and especially from Christian principles. There can be no fundamental objection to any of them from that type of religion which declares that it does not matter under what system you live, or that religion has no reference to economics. There has been up to the present a strong objection on the part of the Roman Catholic authorities to Socialism. That is due mainly to accidental circumstances and accompaniments, partly

because Socialism on the Continent is often associated with atheism or anti-clericalism, for which the Church is not wholly blameless ; but also to the extreme definition of Socialism as the socialisation of everything and the abolition of all private property. But this is no longer the proposal of moderate Socialism ; and it would be a great advantage if the Roman Church, which so believes in accurate definition, would now say which is the Socialism it condemns, and why.

It is wholly right when it is declared in the name of Christianity that salutary economic reforms will not be successfully realised without religious inspiration, and that the perfection of the economic system would not satisfy the heart of man. It is when Socialism erects itself into a religion that it encounters the protest and resistance of the religious interest.

But there are misunderstandings which ought to be cleared up. Religion can be seen to be the critical factor. For it is obvious that great changes cannot be widely welcomed unless they are shown to have a religious sanction. You cannot convert people to them, especially to those things involving sacrifice, without a religious appeal ; and none of these reforms would satisfy men unless religion remained the dominant thing. Therefore the

bringing together of religion and economics is the most immediate necessity for this generation. It has to be remembered that the present system is definitely non-religious ; it can easily be seen that it is at many points anti-Christian, and it is a matter of interest to notice that the system is one of the results of the Reformation, and the logical outcome of the individualism it fostered. Moreover, a great deal of the opposition to reform is confessedly selfish, cynical, and as anti-religious as any Socialism has ever been ; it is nothing else but a desire for the maintenance of the right to exploit, and much of the demand for unrestricted private enterprise is more like a demand for the legitimisation of public burglary. The public unconcern of social reformers towards religion is unfortunate and hindering, but may be often due only to a misunderstanding ; though it is also true that a great many persons obsessed with economics have fundamentally wrong notions about life and human nature, for they imagine that an economic change is all that is necessary, and can be undertaken without reference to religion. Whether we can bring the various elements of truth on both sides together, and get rid of the misunderstandings and errors on both sides, and whether we can do it in time, is the great problem which is pressing upon us.

For unless some great economic change takes place we can dare to predict destruction for industrial civilisation, and that within two hundred years ; for either it will slowly cease to function, or it will be violently destroyed, which will have the same results in both cases, anarchy and starvation. This menace, as it draws nearer, and the impossibility of averting it without religious awakening, may be the very means of leading our thoughtless world back to faith ; for our economic troubles are ultimately due to our rejection of religion, and will not be relieved without its revival.

Christ is the creative centre for a true economic ; and if we can get an understanding that economics is part of our confession of God ; that human nature must be converted before it can accept the economics of the Kingdom ; and that all economics must be governed by an eternal aim and supplemented by a rich internal experience, then economic reform of almost unlimited beneficence and emancipating release is within our reach. But if man endeavours to make economics a concern entirely of this world, and if there is not open to man a religious experience which will make him content with a moderate sufficiency, there is no such thing as a solution to our economic problems, and we can only look forward to

a weary future of strife and anarchy, of hate and misery. But between us and such pessimistic fears there stands Christ, in this, as on every other issue, the Hope of the world.

Chapter IX *Christ and Human Unrest*

THE great practical problem, to which all the other problems run up, and upon whose solution they all depend, is whether religion, and particularly the Christian religion, can satisfy human nature, give to life an elevating and realisable purpose, and make existence worth enduring.

Under its present condition human nature is profoundly and increasingly restless ; and it is this restless condition which provides the uncertain and intractable factor in such problems, for instance, as those of world peace and economic security. It is, again, the burden of an unsatisfying existence which makes so heavy the more theoretical problems of the immensity of the universe, the extended endurance of time, and the multitudinous masses of humanity. This same restlessness has an obvious bearing also on the relationships between the races, on the attempt to create a stable State, and on the endeavour to find any adequate guidance in the religions of the world. Moreover, it is the restlessness of human nature which both provides the

impetus for the production of wealth and prevents its equitable distribution. Because man is not at rest he often works merely in order to forget his interior condition, and then his work becomes purposeless and aimless, and we get the worship of work as such, whether it is work that blesses or curses ; or he works in order to provide an excess of stimulating food and drink, or to secure possession of such objects as will bring pleasure to him, in the idea that in these things he will find satisfaction and contentment ; and it is in pursuing this obviously fruitless task that production gets overweighted in the direction of luxuries, and so causes in turn an insufficiency of necessities, which creates poverty, and so produces inevitable unrest in those that suffer under it.

Again, it is human unrest which is the psychological and, therefore, intractable factor in the problem of peace. As one of the instigators of war, we must give a large place to the aggressive spirit—a spirit which, because it is not at rest, like a fractious child, is inclined to strike out in all directions, and especially at any one who is supposed to be thwarting or insulting it. It is that same restlessness which provides the spur to military ambition. Men imagine if they could only possess and rule over more territory, they would be content.

Moreover, under racial and national pride, which we saw was so tremendous a factor in war, we can discern the individual seeking to compensate for his own unimportance by the importance of his nationality or of his race. As John, Fritz, or Sam we are just ourselves, and are not intolerable, but as British, German, or American our bosoms swell with pride, and we become unbearable to one another. Restlessness often makes it attractive to undertake the risky adventure of arms, which is actually welcomed as promising relief from the tedium of ordinary life and as an escape, perhaps, from intolerable home conditions, and especially from intolerable interior conditions of soul. War also offers the thrill of fame and glory, which man craves in order to make himself big enough to satisfy his fantasies.

Now, if only human nature could be given interior rest the other problems would be soluble or press less heavily. Without that they are beyond solution, for there is no secular cure for human unrest. Begin at the lowest realm of the physical and material, and no cure for unrest will be found there. If we look out on life superficially, we might easily conclude that human unrest is due to the lack of physical and material things. It is because men are without a sufficiency that the

physical cravings of hunger, cold, and sex are so clamant and make contentment impossible ; and it has been believed that it is the struggle for these things which is the cause of all human activity. Long ago a somewhat cynical observer said, " All the labour of man is for his mouth." Therefore, if this theory is correct, the moment man was satisfied the very incentive of his activity would be destroyed. Yet, on the contrary, there is no sign that when a sufficiency is gained, unrest is relieved. For the majority, either the satisfaction point is never reached, or if it is reached, it only creates in its turn, or makes us aware of, other deeper and less easily satisfied desires. What a tragedy it is, that most of us spend all our lives striving after certain things which, when secured, we find to be not what we really want !

Then there is the much nobler, secular Socialism, which holds that human happiness will be found in living for others, and especially in striving for a better life for all on this earth and the generations yet to come ; for it is held that the perfectibility of human life is almost limitless if man would only bend his energies to this end. This Socialism may be the duty of religion, the love of God expressed in love of neighbour, but it can never be a substitute for religion. Even if the human race could be guaranteed an everlasting succession on this

planet, and if the possibilities of progress were simply infinite, it would still have to be determined what it is that we must labour to secure for others. It must either be happiness in the individual, or some perfect kind of State. If it is the former, we have the impossible task of either satisfying every one with a different standard of happiness or converting everybody to one type ; or, if it is the perfect State which we are to seek, then we shall have to sacrifice some individuals who would spoil any State ; and some have so set their hearts on the perfect State that they would murder every one in order to achieve a mere abstraction. Moreover, as progress on this hypothesis is endless, the perfect State will never be reached ; however perfect it is, man will be restless for something better. It is not that there is anything wrong with progress, but progress itself cannot be a substitute for religion.

But neither can rest be found in mental satisfaction. This attempt may take the lowest form of trying to satisfy the desire for power or the longing for fame. But there is no extent of power and there is no area of fame that will satisfy ambition, once it is kindled ; it only flames the more, the more it is fed. The conqueror, the ruler, the artist, each in his realm, has bidden for fame ; but Alexander sighs for fresh worlds to conquer ; Napoleon recognises

that Christ with His cross has more chance for fame than himself; and Nebuchadnezzar as builder, and Nietzsche as a literary artist, lose their reason in the attempt to satisfy their ambition.

Or let the desire for rest take a higher form and propose to itself, what seems right enough, that since man's mind cannot be at rest until it finds truth, truth shall be sought and loved most of all. But if we set out to rest our minds by seeing how much knowledge we can acquire, we shall certainly never catch up with our ambitions. Under modern conditions knowledge is so vast and varied, that to know anything thoroughly one must be content to master one subject; and ambition must be very easily satisfied to be content with anything like that.

Or if man leaves the realms of science, which are too vast for any one nowadays to call himself a scientist, and seeks to satisfy the desire for truth by studying its more abstract and refined notions, then he is faced with the wreckage of philosophical systems strewn all down the ages, and with that modern blockade of the truth known as agnosticism, and, still more, that fundamental scepticism which is biting into the modern mind, the doubt whether man's mind has the capacity for truth.

Or if it is attempted to satisfy the soul with

beauty in art or literature, it will be found that art and literature are so tinged with man's boundless hopes, so threaded with his religious aspirations, that, if these aspirations are without reality or realisation, then these pursuits become little more than studies in the melancholy and madness of man.

All efforts to construct a satisfying humanitarianism have proved fruitless. Take as an example that great attempt made by Auguste Comte of abandoning the idea of God altogether, while retaining the idea of religion, and making humanity " the grand being " who is to be the object of our worship ; the dreadful failure of the religious side of Positivism compared with the enormous success of its scientific side is a sufficient evidence that there is little hope in that direction. The idea that humanity should be the object of worship is a somewhat poorly concealed fraud. We need not adopt Carlyle's confession that he would as soon worship a wilderness of monkeys. But no one ever worships humanity ; what is worshipped is a selection of humanity, or at the most an ideal of humanity, and it is more likely to be a concealed worship of oneself.

The type of secular idealism, which I take to be the teaching of the Italian philosopher, Croce, makes one more desperate attempt to find a philosophical substitute for religion. It

is built up very largely on the study of literature, and it is an attempt to regard man's idealistic constructions as ultimate reality. It is willing even to take in religion, so long as religion is recognised to be nothing more than man's creation, and only a kind of poetry. But this means taking dreams for life, and surely few of us could be satisfied with what is obviously the apotheosis of fantasy.

Even if we rise higher and attempt a kind of secular mysticism, we shall not solve our problem. There is a mysticism which derives nothing from religion. It is a sense of oneness with all life, and this brings a feeling of satisfaction because it seems to anchor us to something profound and unchangeable, and this sense of oneness is taken to bring us in touch with reality. It may be felt sometimes in friendship, but more often in the presence of nature in its more exalted and sublime moods. This feeling of oneness is not to be identified with any crude reality outside oneself, or with mere everlasting existence: it is oneness with that which is real within oneself and anywhere, here and now; it is eternity and infinity glimpsed within the soul. But apart from the fact that this sense would be too vague to satisfy every one, and that few ever get these moments of bliss with anything like the intensity and never with the continuity they desire, the whole

tendency of this secular mysticism is to regard waking life as itself a dream and these interior moments as reality. But the moment you really get to that conviction, waking life does not so much become a dream as a nightmare.

On the other hand, we do not want a rest which would merely reduce human life to stagnation. This is the effect of the mysticism embodied in some of the Eastern religions. It is the effect of Hinduism, which regards this life as an illusion. According to the strict Hindu theory, not only is contemplation of the Absolute the only activity worth considering, but absorption in the impersonal Absolute is the one thing for which we should personally strive and crave.

Buddhism carries this Hindu idea still further. Its fundamental basis is the estimate of human existence as almost unbearable suffering, from which the only way of escape is by the utter cessation of desire. If desire can once be killed, then Nirvana is reached. Now, whatever is meant by Nirvana—and modern scholars are very disagreed as to what Buddha meant by it—or whether it has any intelligible meaning at all, it is not absorption in God ; for in this system there is either no God at all, or the gods are under the same necessity of finding an escape as man. So if Nirvana is not to be identified simply with ceasing to exist, then the only

alternative explanation is that it is a kind of blissful sleep, the kind of sleep in which one is just conscious of being asleep and very comfortable ; and that for ever.

Mahommedanism, with its identification of the will of God with all that happens, only adds to the stagnation of the Eastern religions the elements of hardness, barbarity, and cruelty.

But by some moderns all religion is alleged to have a stagnating effect. At present there is a great temptation to prefer the East to the West. The feverish activity of the West, which produces so little real enjoyment for all the work it does, and leads inevitably to such ugliness and cruelty and war, is being contrasted by many writers with the peace and dignity and beauty of the East. But, however much we may criticise the West for its failures, to go back to the East and its civilisation is surely not seriously meant or seriously preferred by any one. If it were, they should not remain here and write about it ; they should emigrate.

But mediæval Christianity has also been blamed for producing stagnation by its exaltation of contemplation above the active life, and its conception that monastic life was the ideal form of Christianity. The domination of the Church in mediæval times is

blamed for preventing the expansion of intellect, scientific discoveries, and the use of money for vicarious trading, otherwise known as usury.

A good deal of modern Christianity is, however, blamed in precisely the same way. It is declared to have taught men submission to sickness, and preached contentment to the poor; religious emotionalism has taken the place of social service, and justice and joy have been postponed to a future state. Those who thus criticise Christianity explain that fortunately few Christians believe their own creed, or follow it consistently; they point out that Protestantism is better than Catholicism, and that Protestantism is only in process of getting rid of religion altogether.

But there are some quite objective things to be said on behalf of Christianity on this issue. It is an interesting and indisputable fact that Christianity is practically coincident with the progress of civilisation. That must be either because Christianity is the cause of that progress, or because it is the only religion which is compatible with progress. There are those who declare that when progress goes a little farther, it will get rid of religion altogether; but that is only a prophecy, and we cannot deal with that. It is more likely that Christianity is the main cause of civilisa-

tion, since it is coincident with it in area and in time.

Moreover, the diseases to which our civilisation is subject, and which are now bringing it under such discredit, can be recognised as due either to the denial of Christianity or to fatal compromise. For instance, there can be no doubt that what we call industrial capitalism is due to the neglect of the Christian warning against making wealth the sole standard of life ; and whatever is held about war, there would be little argument that it was due to unwillingness to follow Christ all the way.

There is no sign whatever that any kind of secularism will bring rest to mankind. Those great evils which hinder and prevent our progress are not likely to be changed by purely secular methods. Moreover, secular perfection, even if obtainable without changing human nature, would not satisfy human nature. Human nature is not satisfied with anything secular, and never will be. The secularisation of life is coincident with an outbreak of pessimism, neurasthenia, and melancholia that threaten to overwhelm modern effort, strength, and mental balance long before any kind of secular perfection can be reached ; and if it still be hoped that the new process of psycho-analysis will be a cure for these conditions, because it will get rid of

religion, which is only a debilitating fantasy of the human mind, it is open to question whether the attempt to dispense with religion is not the cause of these mental conditions which are growing to be such a menace.

It is impossible to prove in advance that Christ can give man that very rest of soul which would bring him peace without at the same time inducing stagnation. That could only be proved by actual experience. But we can inquire what kind of rest Christ can give to man, and wherein it has promise of being the one thing needful. It will be found to operate by producing harmony and reconciliation where otherwise there is opposition or extremes. First, it balances the inner with the outer life. Christ's rest is an interior peace, produced in the personality by the assurance of its permanence and perfectibility. Trust in this assurance sets one free from the central worry that our very self is going to collapse or that our greatest ambitions will never be realised ; and the communication of Christ's companionship satisfies the hunger for something greater than ourselves. These two things, central worry and central hunger, are the causes that corrupt all our external works and ways. If one is right at the centre, then one is left free for exploring and creative work ; not in the endeavour to satisfy the

heart, but in the endeavour to express its satisfaction. Christianity therefore balances the contemplative and the active life. It may be that some are specially called to the contemplative life; but in the ordinary person contemplation and action must be balanced if the soul is to continue in health.

Secondly, the rest Christ gives is due to the balance His outlook strikes between the attraction of this world and the next. Christianity holds the next world to be infinitely important, because it is eternal, especially in contrast with this, which is merely temporary; but that does not mean that this world is despised. This world is regarded as a training-ground for the world to come, and therefore the more strenuous, careful, and extended that training can be made, the more the world to come is going to mean to us. This is the only outlook that gives to life a worthy meaning, to effort a sufficient drive, and to ambition an adequate aim.

Rest is also found through the balancing of the spiritual and the material; for Christianity leans neither to an absolute materialism nor to an absolute spiritualism. It prescribes the spiritual as the end and aim of life, but the gaining of spiritual life is through the use of the material; by the careful, faithful use of material things, even in thes mallest affairs, we attain spiritual life, character, and capacity.

According to the teaching of Jesus, it is the striving for a justice beyond that of the Pharisee which will secure for us an entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven. He put the matter in an even more popular way. Use your money, He says, to make to yourself permanent friends: buy your way into the eternal society by your faithful, merciful use of the commonest gifts of life.

If this conclusion of the whole matter be true, and the solution of all our problems is in Christ, we ought to accept this for ourselves and seek to commend Christ to men. How can this be most effectively done for our generation at such a critical turning-point in history?

Christianity must be shown to be that truth which gives rest to the mind, and the only truth that does. It proposes to the mind an eternal, personal God, who is the ground of all things, who has been revealed to us in an historic human Personality, and it makes perfect union with Him the ultimate object of our existence and discipline here on earth. In making God, and not merely an ideal, or perfectible human society, the aim of all our efforts, desire and reality are equated when both are worked through to the end. It assures us that man has never had a desire that God cannot satisfy.

But it has to be brought home to more than the mind. It must be brought home to the heart, through that inner experience of the rest which Christ claims to give. Now, when we say that Christ claims to give this, we do not mean that men have not found rest in any other religion or in any other way ; what we maintain is that Christ makes intelligible and accessible to all a universal experience which will be found approximated to elsewhere, namely, personal salvation through intimate friendship with the Infinite. Now, this inner experience brings the assurance of being loved by the Supreme ; it gives value to personality, the value which is summed up in the declaration that Christ died for men. That interior friendship brings rectification, completion, and enlargement to the soul. This is completely realised by reason, by faith, and by work ; work including both prayer and service for others.

It is true that to bring these things home to men requires a measure of consideration and an earnest effort which at the present hour very few seem to be willing to give to religion. But the unrest which is already like a threatening cloud upon humanity's horizon may force men to find this rest where, as a matter of human testimony, it alone has ever been found.

Moreover, the rest that Christ brings is no stagnation. Christianity does not deny progress, nor does it want to destroy civilisation ; but it would guide progress on to the right path, and that an infinite one ; and it would seek to save civilisation from the destruction which at present it is preparing for itself. If we wish to understand how man progresses, and yet may be progressing in the wrong direction, and therefore be needing salvation, we must try to understand the doctrine of the Fall, and how that doctrine dictates the redemption which Christianity proposes. The doctrine of the Fall is most profoundly and most regrettably misunderstood even by Christian people. The Christian doctrine of the Fall means that man has made an attempt at Godhead. What was wrong in that was not desiring Godhead, for that is precisely what the Christian redemption ultimately promises him. His mistake was in attempting to seize it by the wrong way. What man sought was mere power, apart from purpose, mere eminence apart from character ; to be himself God, though out of communion with God. Now, although what is called original sin has had a corrupting influence on the whole of man's nature and on the whole of man's activities, that corruption does not go nearly so far as has been held in some conceptions of the Fall.

What is implied in the Catholic conception of original sin, is that sin is entirely man's original creation ; it does not belong to the ultimate basis of things. That is the first hopeful point about original sin. Secondly, it is not a sheer creation ; it is a perversion ; it is a change of something in itself perfectly good into something partially, but because of its original nature, never wholly evil ; therefore the evil which dogs man's footsteps, perverts his progress, and cheats his highest aspirations, can be changed by a very simple thing, namely, by the restoration of man to right relationships with God. It is this which Christ restores by His Incarnation, and ministers to man by His Spirit.

Christ's rest offers to man the only consummation that justifies our existence, namely, union with God ; complete personal satisfaction of the heart and mind in union with infinite love and truth and beauty. But God is to be contemplated and enjoyed in communion with all His saints, and not alone. We cannot shut out concern for others ; we depend upon them, and they depend upon us. Only as the Body of Christ are we lifted up in Christ to the life of God. And since all things are held together in the mind and the heart of God, contemplation of Him means contemplation of all things in their original

perfection and in the light of glory. It means, finally, that we have perfect access both to His mind and to His heart ; there is perfect understanding and perfect love, for we are made one with Him ; and in union with Him all our problems will finally fade away.

It cannot be objected that all this is only a speculation and hope ; for enough have had experience in this life through inner religion and through fellowship with the Church to know that these things have at least the promise of fulfilment ; and that a wide experience of Christ's rest would make a heaven anywhere, interior, and therefore exterior ; for man will either build Babylon out of his Babylonian heart or the New Jerusalem out of the heart that is at rest. And it is this rest, and this alone, which can make heaven for man, either in this world or in the world to come.

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